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As labor unions are declining,' so too is the legal framework
that has governed labor relations in the United States since the
New Deal. In the past decade, the New Deal labor laws,2 which
were intended to create collective rights for workers and to em-
power organized labor, have been undermined through a series of
judicial and administrative decisions.3 The underlying premises
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I Union membership has declined from approximately 25 percent of the nonagricultural
workforce in 1980 to 16.3 percent in 1990. See notes 6-7 and accompanying text (Table I).
2 The most important federal labor laws enacted in the New Deal period were the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, Pub L No 49 Stat 449 (1935), codified at 29 USC §§ 151 et seq
(1988) (the "NLRA"), and the Norris-La Guardia Act, Pub L No 47 Stat 70 (1932), codified
at 29 USC §§ 101 et seq (1988).
' See generally Lee Modjeska, The Reagan NLRB, Phase 1, 46 Ohio St L J 95, 130-31
(1985) ("In my view ... the [Reagan Era] Board reversals are of major import and pro-
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and assumptions of the labor relations system have also been the
subject of intense scholarly attack.4 Overall, it appears that the era
of collective bargaining that was born in the New Deal and that
blossomed in the post-war decades is coming to an end.
With the old system of collective bargaining fading away,
something new is emerging to take its place. In the past decade,
state legislatures and courts have created a plethora of new em-
ployment rights for individual workers-rights not to be fired abu-
sively, rights for privacy on the job, rights to be free of drug test-
ing, rights to be free of sexual harassment, rights for
whistleblowers, and so forth. Paradoxically, these new individual
employee rights are emerging just as labor's collective rights are
waning. Do these new individual rights signify a fundamental
change in the system of legal regulation of employment in this
country? Or are they merely an accretion to, or embellishment of,
the New Deal system of collective bargaining? This question is im-
portant if we want to understand what is happening to the law
governing labor relations and influence its future course. If the
New Deal system of collective bargaining is collapsing, and if a new
system is emerging, it is important to recognize that fact, and initi-
ate a public debate about the strengths and weaknesses of the new
system, the old system, and others that might be imagined.
There is a plausible argument that the newly emerging indi-
vidual employment rights are an evolution of the pre-existing sys-
tem of collective bargaining. After all, the new individual employ-
ment rights seem perfectly compatible with the system of
foundly alter the preexisting balance of labor management relations . . ."); James B. Atle-
son, Reflections on Labor, Power, and Society, 44 Md L Rev 841, 871 (1985) (arguing that
recent Board and Supreme Court decisions have weakened union power, and that these
decisions reflect, and further, the growing imbalance of power between unions and corporate
structures); William B. Gould IV, Some Reflections on Fifty Years of the National Labor
Relations Act: The Need for Labor Board and Labor Law Reform, 38 Stan L Rev 937, 939
(1986) (arguing that the Reagan Board has exhibited a "pronounced hostility to unions and
collective bargaining"). See also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate
Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U Chi L Rev 73 (1988)
(detailing recent legal decisions that have restricted the power of unions to influence strate-
gic corporate decisionmaking).
" See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Cri-
tique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 Yale L J 1357 (1983); Charles Fried, Individual
and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law
and Its Prospects, 51 U Chi L Rev 1012 (1984); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War
Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 Yale L J 1509 (1981); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradi-
calization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941,
62 Minn L Rev 265 (1978). See also James B. Atleson, Values and Assumptions in Ameri-
can Labor Law (Massachusetts, 1983).
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collective bargaining. Indeed, they might enhance labor's strength
in the workplace by setting a floor above which unions negotiate.
They might also strengthen unions by removing the more general
issues from the bargaining table, thus permitting unions to focus
on those issues of particular concern to each workplace. This more
finely-tuned form of bargaining could strengthen loyalty at the lo-
cal level and thereby create stronger labor organizations. Greater
individual employment rights might also remove sources of conflict
within unions. Externally imposed employment terms represent
tradeoffs made by a legislature or court, rather than by un-
ions-tradeoffs between the young and the old, the black and the
white, and so forth. Thus they spare unions the potentially divisive
effects of making such decisions themselves.
However, despite the variety of ways in which external em-
ployment rights could be benign or even beneficial to organized la-
bor, the rise of individual employment rights has not had that ef-
fect. Rather, there is a tension between the new individual
employment rights and the New Deal system of collective bargain-
ing, a tension that means, concretely, that organized workers do
not share in the benefits of the new employment rights. Examining
why this is so will enable us to see that the newly emerging system
is a distinct and separate form of legal regulation. And recognizing
that reality will enable us to confront the normative issue: What
system of legal rules is best suited for regulating employment
relations?
I begin in Section I with a description of union decline and a
discussion of several theories that have been offered to explain it.
In Section II, I summarize the developments of the past decade in
labor and employment law in order to illustrate in more detail
what I described above: that the National Labor Relations Board
(the "NLRB") and the courts in recent years have diminished the
ability of unions to provide job security for their members while, at
the same time, state legislatures have begun providing some modi-
cum of job security for individual employees.
In Section III, I ask: What has the rise of individual rights
meant for unionized workers? The answer lies in the labor law doc-
trine of § 301 preemption. Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act grants federal jurisdiction over suits for violations of
collective bargaining agreements. Under § 301, courts determine
whether the collective bargaining agreement preempts claims an
employee brings under external statutory or common law rights. I
show that by means of a broad § 301 preemption doctrine, courts
have erected a rigid barrier between collectively bargained rights
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and individual employment rights. As a result, unionized workers
now have, in many respects, fewer employment rights than do their
nonunion brothers and sisters.
In Section IV, I argue that the reason the courts have adopted
such a broad § 301 preemption doctrine is the conception of collec-
tive bargaining that has dominated judicial and scholarly thinking
about collective bargaining in the post-war era. That particular
conception of labor relations, which I call "industrial pluralism," 5
is based on private bargaining and private contractual rights. Its
reasoning and rhetoric resists the injection of statutory or judi-
cially-created employment rights into the workplace, promoting in-
stead a vision of the workplace as a self-sufficient realm.
Finally, in Section V, I discuss three normative and policy
questions that the analysis raises: First, is the emerging system of
individual employment rights preferable to the New Deal system
of collective bargaining? Second, are there forms of collective bar-
gaining that do not insulate the unionized workplace from external
sources of rights? And third, does the § 301 preemption analysis
and legal incompatibility between individual and collective rights
play a role in union decline? I then conclude by arguing that the
individual rights model of employment relations does not provide
an adequate substitute for collective bargaining, and that a new
model of collective workplace rights is necessary if we are to pro-
mote workplace justice and protect workers' standards of living.
I. UNION DECLINE
No discussion of modern labor relations can ignore the fact of
union decline. Between 1980 and 1990, union membership declined
from almost twenty-five percent of the nonagricultural work force
to less than seventeen percent. The following table traces union
decline both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the non-
agricultural workforce:
Stone, 90 Yale L J at 1514-17 (cited in note 4); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Re-
envisioning Labor Law: A Response to Professor Finkin, 45 Md L Rev 978, 978-80 (1986).
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TABLE I
DECLINING UNION MEMBERSHIP 6
Absolute Number of Union Members as Percentage
Workers in Unions of Non-Agricultural Workforce
Year Total % Change % % Change
1950 14,267 31.5%
1960 17,049 19.5% 31.4% (0.3%)
1970 19,381 13.7% 27.3% (13.1%)
1980 22,366 15.4% 24.7% (9.5%)
1990 16,740 (25.2%) 16.1% (34.8%)
Note that the decade of the 1980s saw a marked hastening of the
rate of decline. 7 Indeed, the declining rate in the 1980s is even
more dramatic for private sector unionism. Between 1983 and
1989, union membership declined from 16.8 percent of the private,
nonagricultural workforce to 12.4 percent8 - an overall decline of
more than twenty-five percent.
There are many theories to explain union decline. One theory,
the employer-opposition theory, posits that unions have declined
as a consequence of intensified union avoidance strategies by em-
ployers. This theory has several variations. One variation stresses
the fact that, in the 1970s, the difference between union and non-
" 1950-70 data from Michael Goldfield, The Decline of Organized Labor in the United
States 10 Table I (Chicago, 1987); 1980 data from id at 11 Table II; 1990 data from 38
Employment & Earnings 228-29, Tables 57 & 58 (Jan 1991).
"During the 1980s .... private sector unions experienced one of their most severe
drops in membership in United States history ..... Leo Troy, Will a More Interventionist
NLRA Revive Organized Labor?, 13 Harv J L & Pub Pol 583, 607 (1990).
Professor Michael Goldfield, in his impressive book, The Decline of Organized Labor
(cited in note 6), argues that union decline is nothing new: There has been a steady and
constant decline in the percentage of the workforce unionized from the mid-1950s until
1980. Professor Goldfield attributes this trend primarily to class forces, growing manage-
ment resistance, union passivity, and pro-employer public policy choices. Id at 180-217.
Thus he discounts explanations that are based on phenomena such as short-term changes in
the demographics of the workforce or employer attitudes. However, while Goldfield does
demonstrate a long-term, slow union decline, he does not address the precipitous, almost
free-fall decline that occurred in the 1980s. lost of his data predate the 1980s, and his data
for the years 1980-85 suggest a new, steeper phase of union decline. Id at 16 (Table 3). To
understand the dramatic decline of the past decade, we need a theory that at least partially
disentangles it from the longer-run steady decline that Goldfield documents.
' Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1991 42 (Table 697) (GPO, 1991). See also
Troy, 13 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 592-94 (cited in note 7).
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union wages was at an all-time high. Therefore employers had
powerful financial incentives to resist unions where they did not
exist and to eliminate them where they did.9 In other words, un-
ions effectively priced themselves out of the market.
Another variation of the employer-opposition theory suggests
that the Reagan Administration's treatment of the air traffic con-
trollers' strike and similar actions encouraged employers to resist
their unions.10 In this view, employers have always been anti-
union, and the shift in official attitudes in the past decade embold-
ened them to act on their predilections.
In yet another variation of the employer-opposition school of
thought, some scholars attribute union decline to an increase in
unlawful employer behavior during election campaigns and the in-
ability of the NLRB effectively to police and remedy employers'
unfair labor practices.11 The most prominent spokesman of this
viewpoint is Professor Paul Weiler of the Harvard Law School. 12
Another group of scholars has attempted to explain union de-
cline with a union-complacency theory. According to this theory,
See, for example, Robert J. Flanagan, NLRA Litigation and Union Representation,
38 Stan L Rev 957, 984-85 (1986).
10 See, for example, Charles McDonald, U.S. Union Membership in Future Decades: A
Trade Unionist's Perspective, 31 Indus Rel 13, 15 (1992) (attributing the precipitous drop
in union membership in the 1980s to President Reagan's actions); Michael J. Goldberg,
Cleaning Labor's House: Institutional Reform Litigation in the Labor Movement, 1989
Duke L J 903, 1002 (hypothesizing the adverse effect of improper governmental intervention
on the labor movement); David L. Gregory, Book Review, 53 Geo Wash L Rev 680, 681-83
(1985) (arguing that the Administration's treatment of the PATCO strike and its reshaping
of the NLRB have combined with recent Supreme Court decisions to create an atmosphere
hostile to unions). See generally Bernard D. Meltzer and Cass R. Sunstein, Public Employee
Strikes, Executive Discretion, and the Air Traffic Controllers, 50 U Chi L Rev 731 (1983)
(analyzing air traffic controllers' strike and its legal consequences).
" See, for example, Modjeska, 46 Ohio St L J at 131 (cited in note 3) (recent NLRB
decisions reflect a "substantial deregulation of employer conduct with a concomitant, poten-
tial disenfranchisement of employee rights and interests"); Paul Alan Levy, The Unidimen-
sional Perspective of the Reagan Labor Board, 16 Rutgers L J 269, 269-70 (1985) ("[I]n the
three years since President Reagan's appointees began to join the Board, there has been an
unprecedented assault on this country's labor laws . . . led by. . . Board members who are
wholly unsympathetic to the [NLRA's] purposes.").
12 Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NRLA, 96 Harv L Rev 1769 (1983) (arguing that the failure of the NLRB to
police and remedy violations of § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA is a major factor in union decline).
However, some scholars have disputed Weiler's data and conclusions. See Robert J. La-
Londe and Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at the Significance
of Employer Illegalities, 58 U Chi L Rev 953, 954-55 (1991), to which Professor Weiler
responded powerfully in Hard Times for Unions: Challenging Times for Scholars, 58 U Chi
L Rev 1015 (1991). See also Leo Troy, Market Forces and Union Decline: A Response to
Paul Weiler, 59 U Chi L Rev 681 (1992). For a critique of employer-opposition explanations
for union decline generally, see Troy, 13 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 590-95 (cited in note 7).
Industrial Pluralism
union decline is a result of the failure of unions to adjust to a
changing economy. Some theorists of this school emphasize the
failure of unions to aggressively organize new members. 13 Some
also cite shifts in the composition of the workforce from white
males to minorities and women-groups to which unions have not
traditionally appealed.14 Still others of this school stress the shift
in the economy away from blue collar manufacturing jobs, which
had been heavily unionized, toward white collar and service jobs,
where unions traditionally have been weak.' 5
No doubt, the employer-opposition and the union-compla-
cency theories each tell part of the story, but neither can fully ac-
count for the phenemonon. For example, while increased employer
opposition to unions is undoubtedly a factor in union decline, it
does not satisfactorily explain why unorganized workers have not
made more efforts to unionize in the face of the declining real
earnings of the 1980s. 1' Similarily, union complacency may explain
why unions in the older manufacturing sectors are declining, but it
does not explain why employees in the new sectors do not union-
ize. 7 Furthermore, to attribute union decline to the failure of un-
ions to organize new types of workers in new types of industries is
to ignore the facts. To the extent that unions have made gains in
recent years, the gains have been among women and minorities, in
the service and white collar sectors. Unions have been growing
'3 See, for example, Gregory, 53 Geo Wash L Rev at 681 (cited in note 10).
" See, for example, Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered
Structure of Wage Labor, 89 Mich L Rev 1155, 1172 (1991) ("the influx of women into the
workforce has been cited as a major barrier to union growth"); Theodore J. St. Antoine,
Federal Regulation of the Workplace in the Next Half Century, 61 Chi Kent L Rev 631,
645 (1985) (attributing union decline, in part, to the failure of unions to appeal to the
young, women, minorities, and white collar workers); Charles B. Craver, The Vitality of the
American Labor Movement in the Twenty-First Century, 1983 U Ill L Rev 633, 648-49
(observing the traditional under representation of minorities and women in unions, and em-
phasizing the need to include these groups); Michael J. Goldberg, Affirmative Action in
Union Government: The Landrum-Griffin Act Implications, 44 Ohio St L J 649, 652-66
(1983) (discussing the history of discrimination in the labor movement and proposing the
use of affirmative action to increase the representation of minorities and women in union
leadership).
" See, for example, Gould, 38 Stan L Rev at 942-43 (cited in note 3) (stressing unions'
inability to organize in "high tech" and developing industries); Troy, 13 Harv J L & Pub Pol
at 612-25 (cited in note 7) (describing shifts from manufacturing to producer services).
" Despite the unprecedented boom years of the 1980s in the financial and real estate
markets, the real wages for production workers in the manufacturing industries declined
over 11% between 1978 and 1988. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1990 407, Ta-
ble 668 (GPO, 1990).
" Professor Troy points to such structural factors to explain union decline, but does
not explain why white collar service workers, or workers in the growing high-tech sector, do
not unionize. Troy, 13 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 612-25 (cited in note 7).
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among public sector employees, hospital workers, retail clerks, and
other pink and white collar types of workers.18 Thus it is just not
true that unions have made no efforts toward those types of work-
ers, nor is it true that unions have had no appeal.
In a recent article, Professor Henry Farber of Princeton Uni-
versity gave a new perspective on union decline. Professor Farber
analyzed several studies of worker attitudes toward unions that
were conducted between 1977 and 1984.19 He concluded that work-
ers were not unionizing for two reasons. First, there was an in-
crease in job satisfaction among unorganized workers, which Far-
ber attributed not to improvements in their pay or job security,
but to their declining expectations.20 Second, the number of non-
union workers who perceived that unions were effective in improv-
ing wages and working conditions had dropped significantly.21 Pro-
8 Between 1983 and 1991, the percentage of union members who are women, blacks,
Hispanics, and managerial and professional employees has grown significantly. This can be
seen in the following tables, which show that in these categories, union membership has
either grown or declined only slightly, while overall union membership has declined sub-
stantially. This has resulted in a net percentage increase of total union membership among
these groups.
TABLE II
Total Union Membership in Absolute Numbers
Total Union Women Blacks Hispanic Managerial
1983 17,717 5,908 2,440 1,042 3,354
1991 16,568 6,138 2,425 1,275 3,802
TABLE III
Composition of Union Membership
Total Union Women Blacks Hispanic Managerial
1983 100% 33.34% 13.77% 5.88% 18.93%
1991 100% 37.05% 14.63% 7.69% 22.94%
1983 data from 32 Employment & Earnings 208-09, Tables 52 & 53 (Jan 1985); 1991 data
from 39 Employment & Earnings 228-29, Tables 57 & 58 (Jan 1992).
These data suggest that to the extent unions have effectively recruited during the
1980s, it has been among these groups. See also Weiler, 58 U Chi L Rev at 1017 (cited in
note 12) ("[S]ince the '50s, unions have also lost major ground within their manufacturing
and construction bases while simultaneously achieving major breakthroughs in the public
sector, in such quintessentially 'female' service occupations as teaching, nursing, and gov-
ernment clerical work.").
11 Henry S. Farber, The Recent Decline of Unionization in the United States, 238
Science 915 (Nov 13, 1987).
'0 Id at 917-19.
21 Id. One of the studies Farber used was conducted by the Harris Survey in 1984. It
concluded that nonunion employees saw unions as "an irrelevant way to solve their work
problems." Troy, 13 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 600 (cited in note 7). Professory Troy also uses
this data to argue that employee opposition is, quantitatively, a more significant factor in
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fessor Farber called this a decline in the perception of "union
instrumentality. '22 On the basis of a statistical model, Professor
Farber concluded that "all of the decline in demand among nonun-
ion workers can be accounted for by the increase in nonunion
workers' satisfaction and decrease in perceptions of union
instrumentality. 23
In short, Farber attributes union decline in large part to de-
clining employee confidence in the power of unions to better
wages, job security, and other working conditions. If he is right, the
problem of explaining union decline then becomes the problem of
determining why the public perception of union effectiveness has
changed in recent years.
Many factors, including cultural and economic factors exoge-
nous to the labor relations system, shape public perceptions of
union effectiveness. But undoubtedly one of these factors is a de-
cline in actual union effectiveness. The decline in actual union ef-
fectiveness cannot summarily be dismissed as simply the natural
result of the inherent weakness of unions. Actual union effective-
ness is, to a large extent, a product of the legal rules that deter-
mine what unions can and cannot do. 4
For example, some legal rules prevent unions from influencing
corporate decisions of importance to their members, such as the
rules prohibiting bargaining for work acquisition or bargaining to
stop double-breasting.25 Other legal rules influence union economic
power, by prohibiting secondary boycotts or permitting employers
to hire permanent replacements during strikes. 26 In short, because
legal rules define union power and effectiveness, changes in the le-
the decline of private-sector unionism than employer opposition. Id at 599-600. See also
Troy, 59 U Chi L Rev at 687-88 (cited in note 12).
22 Farber, 238 Science at 918 (cited in note 19).
", Id at 919.
24 See Stone, 55 U Chi L Rev at 85 & n 43 (cited in note 3) (discussing labor law rules
that regulate labor's and management's power). See also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Legal
Regulation of Economic Weapons: A Comparative Perspective, in Bruno Stein, ed, Pro-
ceedings of New York University 43d Annual National Conference on Labor 79, 82-87 (Lit-
tle, Brown, 1990) (discussing how the legal rules defining labor's right to strike and employ-
ers' right to hire replacements shapes each side's economic power). See generally Robert L.
Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 Colum L Rev 603, 625-28 (1943) (argu-
ing that market power of employees and employers is a function of the compulsion they are
legally permitted to bring against the other).
"5 See Stone, 55 U Chi L Rev at 114-17 (cited in note 3).
2 See Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace 264-73 (Harvard, 1991) (criticizing
strike replacement rule and ban on union boycotts of struck product for unduly restricting
union bargaining power); Atleson, Values and Assumptions at 19-34 (cited in note 4) (criti-
cizing strike replacement rule on same grounds).
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gal rules governing labor-management relations might partially ex-
plain the decline of union effectiveness. Accordingly, to understand
union decline, we must examine the content of the labor laws.27
The Farber analysis suggests that changes in legal rules may
be a factor in union decline. However, the causal arrows go both
ways. Legal rules not only determine power, but are also a result of
power. When labor is weak, the labor laws are weakened. The
decline of unions and the weakening of the labor laws are mutually
reinforcing features of the labor relations landscape.
Part of my task here is to describe some of the legal rules that
have compromised union effectiveness in the past decade. My the-
sis is that to the extent that unions are currently perceived as inef-
fective, this perception is not fanciful, but rather reflects a reason-
ably correct understanding of how present labor law doctrine
inhibits the power of unions to improve the wages and working
conditions of their members.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
The past decade has witnessed a shift from a legal system that
protects collective employee rights to one that protects individual
employment rights. In this shift, labor relations have been deregu-
lated and then reregulated in an individualized and decentralized
fashion. Through a series of judicial and administrative decisions,
federal judges and government officials have rewritten the legal
rules of collective bargaining-rules that had once protected collec-
tive, as opposed to individual, bargaining between employers and
employees-so as to strip them of their regulatory bite. At the
same time, state legislatures and courts have reregulated labor re-
lations by recognizing new individual employment rights.
217 Professor Weiler has also suggested that the decline of unions can be explained by
developments in the labor law. See Weiler, 96 Harv L Rev at 1774-81 (cited in note 12), in
which he blames the law governing union organizing campaigns. Specifically, he argues that
the dramatic increase in discriminatory discharges during representation campaigns, and
the NLRB's ineffectiveness in preventing or remedying such unlawful employer conduct,
plays a significant role in union decline. Id. See also Weiler, 58 U Chi L Rev 1015 (cited in
note 12) (responding to LaLonde and Meltzer, 58 U Chi L Rev 953 (cited in note 12)). While
I find the Weiler thesis compelling, my argument relies less on the law of employee organiz-
ing, and more on the law governing the exercise of union power at the bargaining table and
in the economic arena.
28 James B. Atleson, The Prospects for Labor Law Reform, 18 Pol Studies J 364, 371
(1989-90) (unions only achieve favorable legislation when they are "perceived to be vital and
troublesome economic actors.").
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A. Federal Deregulation of Collective Labor Rights
Since the 1930s, the National Labor Relations Act has empow-
ered collective labor action by protecting the right to organize and
to strike, and by requiring employers to bargain with their work-
ers' collective representative.29 However, in the past decade, the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") and the federal courts
have reinterpreted the statute so as to dismantle its collective,
group-empowering features.
For example, the NLRB has diluted severely the statutory
protection of union organizing.30 Whereas the NLRB once re-
stricted when an employer could make knowingly false and preju-
dicial statements about a union during an organizing campaign, it
now permits such statements.3 1 Similarily, whereas previously an
employer was prohibited from polling employees during union
campaigns unless there were strict safeguards to guard against co-
ercion, polls are now generally permitted.3 2 These changes are part
of the general trend toward deregulation of union election
campaigns.33
An even more important aspect of the deregulation of labor
relations has occurred in the area of union input into employer
strategic-level decisionmaking3 4 In the past decade, such corporate
29 NLRA §§ 7, 8(a), codified at 29 USC §§ 157, 158(a) (1988). See Stone, 55 U Chi L
Rev at 83-84 & n 41 (cited in note 3) (arguing that NLRA § 8(a) furthers the collectivist
aims of the statute).
"0 See Weiler, 96 Harv L Rev at 1788 (cited in note 12) ("[The NLRA's] remedial phi-
losophy as it has evolved ... is heavily oriented toward the repair of harm inflicted on
individual victims of antiunion activity," instead of toward protecting the employees' collec-
tive rights.). See generally Levy, 16 Rutgers L Rev 269 (cited in note 11).
" Midland National Life Insurance Co., 263 NLRB 127, 133 (1982), overruling Gen-
eral Knit of California, Inc., 239 NLRB 619 (1978), and Hollywood Ceramics Co., Inc., 140
NLRB 221 (1962).
11 Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176, 1177-78 (1984) (overruling the per se prohibition
of employer polling in favor of evaluating the poll in light of the totality of the circum-
stances), enforced as Hotel Employees & Restaurant Union v NLRB, 760 F2d 1006 (9th Cir
1985).
13 See Lechmere, Inc. v NLRB, 112 S Ct 841 (1992) (permitting employer to prohibit
solicitation by non-employee union organizers at employer's parking lot and overturning
NLRB's balancing approach to union access cases). See also Weiler, 96 Harv L Rev at 1774-
81 (cited in note 12) (discussing deregulation of election campaigns); Dan C. Heldman,
James T. Bennett, and Manuel H. Johnson, Deregulating Labor Relations 49-76 (Fisher
Institute, 1981) (calling for the deregulation of union representation elections).
" The notion of strategic-level corporate decisions is adopted from Thomas A. Kochan,
Harry C. Katz, and Robert B. McKersie, The Transformation of American Industrial Rela-
tions 15-18 (Basic, 1986), in which they describe a three-tier framework of management
decisions. Strategic-level decisions are about "what businesses to invest in, where to locate
worksites, whether to make or buy various components, and the organizational arrange-
ments used to carry out basic strategies . . . ." Id at 18.
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decisions to engage in mergers, takeovers, or other restructurings
have cost union members tens of thousands of jobs. 5 Despite this
impact, the rules of collective bargaining have made it considerably
more difficult for unions to protect their membership. The NLRB
has exempted employers from the obligation to bargain about most
such decisions, adopting instead a policy of deference to the em-
ployer's business judgment and business rationality.3 s In addition,
under established doctrine, when a company sells its assets, the
purchaser has no obligation to retain the former workforce or to
honor labor agreements inherited from the seller.37 And if a union
negotiates a contractual provision that prevents an employer from
35 The AFL-CIO estimates that in the 1980s its members lost over 80,000 jobs due to
takeovers alone, and overall more than 500,000 jobs. Hostile Takeovers, Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong, 1st Sess 261, 262
(Apr 8, 1987) (statement of Thomas R. Donahue, Secretary-Treasurer, AFL-CIO).
Whether or not takeovers and other corporate restructurings have in fact harmed em-
ployees is a subject of debate. There is significant anecdotal evidence, in addition to Mr.
Donahue's statement above, that employees have been harmed by corporate takeovers. See,
for example, Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Take-
overs, in Alan J. Auerbach, ed, Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences 33, 49-50
(Chicago, 1988) (in the TWA takeover, employee wage reductions amounted to one and one-
half times the takeover premium stockholders received). There is also some empirical evi-
dence that employment levels decrease after management buyouts. See, for example, Steven
Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and Value, 24 J
Fin Econ 217, 241, Table 9 (1989) (finding that firms experiencing a management buyout
between 1980 and 1986 had employment decreases of between 6% and 12%, when data
adjusted according to industry); Krishna G. Palepu, Consequences of Leveraged Buyouts,
27 J Fin Econ 247, 252-53 (1990) ("[B]uyout firms offer lower growth in employment oppor-
tunities than other firms in their industries.").
On the other hand, some studies about the impact of takeovers on employees do not
support the claim that takeovers cause job loss. See Frank R. Lichtenberg and Donald
Siegel, The Effect of Ownership Changes on the Employment and Wages of Central Office
and Other Personnel, 33 J L & Econ 383, 401-02 (1990) (showing that the disparity in em-
ployment levels between companies that changed owners and those that did not actually
lessened after the change); Charles Brown and James L. Medoff, The Impact of Firm Ac-
quisitions on Labor, in Auerbach, ed, Corporate Takeovers 9, 23 (finding that employment
in firms involved in acquisitions declined approximately 5% after sales of assets, but that
employment increased by 9% after simple sales and by 2% after simple mergers); Joshua G.
Rosett, Do Union Wealth Concessions Explain Takeover Premiums?, 27 J Fin Econ 263,
279-80 (1990) (finding that firms that experienced hostile takeovers between 1976 and 1987
had a modest wage gain).
"e See Stone, 55 U Chi L Rev at 86-96 (cited in note 3).
37 NLRB v Burns International Security Services, 406 US 272, 281-91 (1972) (successor
employer not bound by substantive provisions of predecessor's collective bargaining agree-
ment); Howard Johnson Co. v Detroit Local Joint Executive Board, 417 US 249, 260-65
(1974) (same). In the event of a merger, unlike a sale of assets, an employer may have some
obligations under the prior collective bargaining agreement. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v
Livingston, 376 US 543, 548 (1964) ("[Iln appropriate circumstances, present here, the suc-
cessor employer may be required to arbitrate with the union under the [predecessor's]
agreement.").
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transferring unionized work to a non-union subsidiary, it runs a
risk of violating the secondary boycott restrictions. 8 As a result,
employer decisions about plant location, introduction of new tech-
nology, closing part of an operation, or restructuring of the firm
have become practically immune from challenge by unions.3 9
Of these new restrictions on union effectiveness, I will discuss
only one-the diminishing scope of the employer's obligation to
bargain with its employees, located in § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.'0 It
has long been accepted that the statutory duty to bargain only ap-
plies to certain areas, called "mandatory subjects of collective bar-
gaining."41 If a subject is a mandatory subject of bargaining,
neither employer nor union can make a unilateral alteration until
it has bargained with the other to the point of impasse.42 And after
impasse is reached, only a mandatory subject can be the subject of
a protected strike.43
There has been a longstanding debate about the scope of
mandatory bargaining, particularly as to whether it obligates an
employer to bargain over strategic-level decisions that affect
jobs-decisions such as plant relocation, partial shut-downs, auto-
mation, subcontracting, and so forth.44 Some scholars and labor
" See, for example, D'Amico v Painters District Council 51, 120 Labor Rel Ref Man
(BNA) 3473, 3474-80 (D Md 1985) (applying a two-part test to determine whether a "work
preservation agreement" is invalid as secondary union activity).
" See Stone, 55 U Chi L Rev at 86-120 (cited in note 3).
" 29 USC § 158(a)(5) ("It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees . . ").
"' NLRB v Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 US 342, 348 (1958).
42 NLRB v Katz, 369 US 736, 743 (1962); Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois Coil
Spring Co., 268 NLRB 601, 602 (1984), enforced as International Union, UAW v NLRB,
765 F2d 175 (DC Cir 1985).
43 Borg-Warner, 356 US at 349 (neither company nor union can insist to impasse on a
nonmandatory bargaining subject). See Michael C. Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-
Warner to First National Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 Va L Rev
1447, 1447 (1982) ("After Borg-Warner, employers and unions [can] not resort to economic
pressure to obtain agreement unless the proposal concerns 'wages, hours, [or] other terms
and conditions of employment.' "). See also Julius G. Getman, Labor Relations 177 (Foun-
dation, 1978) ("When no collective agreement is in force, the use of economic pressure by an
incumbent union in support of its bargaining demands is protected if the subject matter of
the demand constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining.").
" See William B. Gould IV, The Burger Court and Labor Law: The Beat Goes
On-Marcato, 24 San Diego L Rev 51, 64 (1987) (advocating broad scope for mandatory
bargaining for decisions affecting job security); Comment, Unfair Labor Practice and Con-
tract Aspects of an Employer's Desire to Close, Partially Close, or Relocate Bargaining
Unit Work, 24 Duquesne L Rev 285, 306-08 (1985) (approving trend toward limiting bar-
gaining obligations in the interest of facilitating free flow of capital essential to economic
growth); James B. Atleson, Management Prerogatives, Plant Closings, and the NLRA, 11
NYU Rev L & Soc Change 83, 104-05 (1982-83) (advocating broad scope for mandatory
bargaining over employer capital decisions); Note, Partial Closings: The Scope of an Em-
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union activists have argued that, if there is no obligation for man-
agement to bargain over those decisions most important to work-
ers, then collective bargaining is not true joint decisionmaking. s
Until 1981, it was generally believed that the bargaining obli-
gation was broad, and that the realm of joint decisionmaking was
expanding.4 6 Then in 1981, the Supreme Court declared that the
scope of bargaining was quite limited, and did not extend to most
employer investment decisions. In First National Maintenance
Corp. v NLRB, the Supreme Court held that an employer was not
required to bargain about a decision to close part of its operation. 47
In setting forth its reasons, the Court introduced a balancing test
for determining the scope of mandatory bargaining: When making
decisions that have a direct impact on employment security, man-
agement is required to bargain "only if the benefit, for labor man-
agement relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs
the burden placed on the conduct of the business." s4
There has been considerable disagreement about what the
First National Maintenance balancing test means. 49 However, the
ployer's Duty to Bargain, 61 BU L Rev 735, 763-72 (1981) (advocating broad duty to bar-
gain in partial closing situations); Robert J. Rabin, Fibreboard and the Termination of Bar-
gaining Unit Work: The Search for Standards in Defining the Scope of the Duty to
Bargain, 71 Colum L Rev 803, 827-36 (1971) (suggesting guidelines for restricting duty to
bargain about capital decisions);. Thomas J. Schwarz, Plant Relocation or Partial Termina-
tion-The Duty to Decision-Bargain, 39 Fordham L Rev 81, 100-02 (1970) (advocating lim-
iting bargaining obligation in relocation and partial closing cases to situations where em-
ployer proposes to substitute unit workers with non-unit workers); Note, Labor Law
Problems in Plant Relocation, 77 Harv L Rev 1100, 1103-06 (1964) (proposing restricting
duty to bargain about relocation decisions). See also Michael L. Wachter and George M.
Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and Applica-
tion to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U Pa L Rev
1349, 1352 (1988) (proposing efficiency criteria for evaluating capital mobility decisions).
41 See Atleson, 11 NYU Rev L & Soc Change at 107-08 (cited in note 44); Gould, 24
San Diego L Rev at 61-64 (cited in note 44). See also Atleson, 44 Md L Rev at 845-47 (cited
in note 3); Stone, 90 Yale L J at 1558-59 (cited in note 4).
46 Borg-Warner, 356 US at 358 (Harlan concurring) ("Provisions which two decades ago
might have been thought to be the exclusive concern of labor or management are today
commonplace in such agreements."). See also Stone, 55 U Chi L Rev at 88 & nn 51-53 (cited
in note 3) (referring to pre-1980 belief in the infinite expandability of bargaining topics).
452 US 666, 686 (1981). Much earlier the Supreme Court made it clear that an em-
ployer had no obligation to bargain about a decision to go out of business altogether. Textile
Workers Union v Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 US 263, 273-74 (1965).
4 First National Maintenance, 452 US at 679.
" The NLRB attempted to interpret the test in Otis Elevator Co., 269 NLRB 891
(1984). Rather than achieving clarity, however, the NRLB split three ways. The plurality
said that First National Maintenance meant that an employer had to bargain when its
decision turned on labor costs rather than on a change in the scope and direction of the
enterprise. Id at 893. A concurring opinion said that an employer was obligated to bargain
when the decision turned on labor costs and the potential benefit from bargaining out-
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NLRB and the courts have agreed that an employer has no obliga-
tion to bargain about a decision that would fundamentally change
the scope or direction of the enterprise.5 0 Similarily, they agree
that decisions made out of a concern for economic factors are ex-
empt from the bargaining obligation.51 Decisions concerning take-
overs, mergers, or other transformations in the corporate identity
fall into these excluded categories. Thus, for most strategic-level
corporate decisions that threaten jobs, there is no legal bargaining
obligation that might enable unions to protect employees at the
time such decisions are made.52 The recent reformulation of the
weighed the costs to the employer of engaging in bargaining. Id at 897. A dissenting opinion
said that an employer should be required to bargain for any decision that turned on overall
costs, because in that case labor costs would be a part of the employer's overall equation. Id
at 900-01. Recently the NLRB reinterpreted the First National Maintenance test in Du-
buque Packing Co., 137 Labor Rel Ref Man (BNA) 1185, 1991 NLRB LEXIS 750, in which
the NLRB repudiated all three of the tests in Otis Elevator, and announced yet another
interpretation of First National Maintenance. 1991 NLRB LEXIS at *19-*20 & n 8. See
note 51.
"a Dubuque Packing Co., 1991 NLRB LEXIS at *27; Arrow Automotive Industries v
NLRB, 853 F2d 223, 225-27 (4th Cir 1988).
"I In Dubuque Packing, the NLRB announced a new two-part test to determine the
scope of mandatory bargaining in cases concerning a plant relocation: "Initially, the burden
is on the General Counsel to establish that the employer's decision involved a relocation ...
unaccompanied by a basic change in the nature of the employer's operation. If the General
Counsel successfully carries his burden in this regard, he will have established prima facie
that the employer's relocation decision is a mandatory subject of bargaining." 1991 NLRB
LEXIS at *27. Then the employer can attempt to rebut the prima facie case by showing
that the work at the new location is significantly different from that at the former location,
or that all work at the former location was to be discontinued. Id. Alternatively, the em-
ployer may show, in defense, that labor costs were not a factor in the decision to relocate, or
that, even if labor costs were a factor, "the union could not have offered labor cost conces-
sions that could have changed the employer's decision to relocate." Id at *27-*28.
This new test for determining the scope of bargaining, like the Otis Elevator test and
the First National Maintenance test itself, retains the notion that an employer's market-
based decisions are shielded from a bargaining obligation. However, Dubuque Packing shifts
the burden of proof on the issue of the employer's motivation.
2 When the labor law does not impose an obligation on an employer to bargain about a
particular decision, it still imposes an obligation to bargain about the effects of the decision
on the workforce. First National Maintenance, 452 US at 677-78 n 15. However, there is
disagreement among scholars as to the actual scope of the requirement to bargain about
effects. Compare Thomas C. Kohler, Distinctions Without Differences: Effects Bargaining
in Light of First National Maintenance, 5 Indus Rel L J 402, 415 (1983) (courts have inter-
preted effects bargaining obligation broadly), with Wilbur Daniels and Seth Kupferberg,
Sale of Assets, Mergers, and Acquisitions: A Union View, in Samuel Estreicher and Daniel
G. Collins, eds, Labor Law and Business Change: Theoretical and Transactional Perspec-
tives 185, 190-91 (Quorum, 1988) (courts and NLRB have been reluctant to require broad
effects bargaining).
Effects bargaining usually takes place within a short time after the employer has made
and implemented a decision, when the union no longer has leverage to protect its members.
If an employer is found to have violated its obligation to engage in effects bargaining, the
courts and the NLRB remedy the violation by requiring the employer to give limited back
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scope of the bargaining obligation effectively insulates decisions
based on overall profitability, efficiency, or other such market-
based factors from the bargaining obligation.
The doctrinal development in the law of mandatory bargain-
ing reflects the trend toward deregulation of labor relations in the
1980s. Deregulation does not merely mean the repeal of regulation;
it also means the reinterpretation of regulation in such a way that
it loses its regulatory bite." While Congress has not repealed the
NLRA, the federal courts and the NLRB have reduced the regime
of regulation to a proxy for the market. In those areas in which
regulation imposes no other obligations on employers than those
imposed by the market, the law has rendered unions superfluous.5 4
pay. The standard formula is back pay for the period from five days after the date of the
court or Board order until the time the parties reach either agreement or impasse, not to
exceed the time the employee was actually out of work and not to be less than two weeks.
Transmarine Navigation Corp., 170 NLRB 389, 390 (1968). In practice, this means that
when a violation is found, the employer quickly bargains to impasse and is liable for back
pay for merely two weeks. See, for example, Yorke v NLRB, 709 F2d 1138, 1144-46 (7th Cir
1983) (imposing penalty of two weeks back pay under Transmarine formula).
" The development in the law of mandatory bargaining has been repeated in other
areas. For example, in the area of employer discrimination against union members, what
had been a blanket prohibition has now been muted by the addition of a business justifica-
tion defense. See, for example, Handy Andy Associates, Inc., 277 NLRB 208, 215-17 (1985)
(no § 8(a)(3) violation for subcontracting decision made when employees refused to abandon
union). See generally Stone, 55 U Chi L Rev at 96-102 (cited in note 3) (business justifica-
tion defense is diluting § 8(a)(3) protections).
" Professors George Cohen and Michael Wachter have argued that the availability of
market rationality as an employer defense is not a retreat from regulation but rather a bet-
ter understanding of the function of labor regulation. They argue that the law should permit
employers to make unfettered business decisions, and that it should only constrain an em-
ployer when he is acting opportunistically by trying to appropriate transaction-specific in-
vestments from his employees. Wachter and Cohen, 136 U Pa L Rev at 1415-17 (cited in
note 44). See also George M. Cohen and Michael L. Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers:
The Law and Economics Approach, in 43d Annual National Conference on Labor 109
(cited in note 24).
This argument ascribes to unions, or to the labor law, the limited role of protecting
workers against opportunistic employer behavior. However, it is both conceptually and prac-
tically difficult to draw the line between profit-maximizing behavior, which Professors Co-
hen and Wachter would protect, and opportunistic behavior, which they would constrain.
Further, it is worth noting that the Cohen/Wachter argument does not distinguish between
preventing employer opportunism by legal rules that empower unions and preventing em-
ployer opportunism by direct, legislatively-imposed employee safeguards. Under the logic of
the Cohen/Wachter argument, unions limit employer opportunism only to the extent that
there are no other generally available legal sanctions against unjust dismissal. If so, then
legal protection against unjust dismissal would render unions even more superfluous. A
more general form of this argument is discussed at notes 243-54 and accompanying text.
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B. State Protection of Individual Employee Rights
At the same time that the federal courts and the NLRB have
undermined the rights of collective labor in the past ten years,
state courts and legislatures have initiated a renaissance of rights
for individual employees. Until recently, the protections for indi-
vidual employment rights in the United States have been minimal
compared to the extensive protections in Western Europe.5 5 They
have been aimed at the margins of economic life, setting only mini-
mum standards for the wage contract, and not otherwise interfer-
ing with its terms. For example, until the late 1970s and 1980s,
nonunion employers could hire and fire at will, unrestrained by un-
just dismissal laws of any sort. In addition, the United States gov-
ernment provides only minimal insurance against unemployment,
retirement, or disability, and no universal health insurance at all.
Health insurance, when it exists, is provided privately, usually by
collective bargaining agreements between individual unions. Com-
pared to the extensive income and job security protections that
workers enjoy in most of Europe, American workers exist in an un-
mediated, unregulated labor market. 6
In the wake of federal cutbacks in measures such as workplace
health and safety regulations and affirmative action programs
under the Reagan and Bush administrations, state courts and leg-
islatures have become the protectors of the individual employee.
This trend is most visible in the area of unjust dismissal. Begin-
ning in the mid-1970s, some state courts began to hold that certain
types of dismissals were unlawful, either as offending a public pol-
icy or as a breach of an implicit term of an employment contract.51
In the 1980s, these isolated decisions became a nationwide trend:
Courts in some thirty-nine states adopted some form of common
law employee protection against unjust dismissal.58 According to
Professor Clyde Summers, as of 1988,
" See Michael Emerson, Regulation or Deregulation of the Labour Market, 32 Eur
Econ Rev 775, 786-800 (1988) (discussing regulation of dismissals, layoffs, temporary em-
ployment, and part-time work in Europe).
51 Id at 776.
'7 State courts have used various tort and contract theories. See, for example, Monge v
Beebe Rubber Co., 114 NH 130, 316 A2d 549 (1974) (employer breached at-will employment
contract by firing employee for refusing to date her supervisor); Frampton v Central Indi-
ana Gas Co., 260 Ind 249, 297 NE2d 425 (1973) (employer committed tort by firing em-
ployee for filing workers' compensation claim); Nees v Hocks, 272 Or 210, 536 P2d 512
(1975) (employer committed tort by firing employee for serving on jury).
8' Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67
Neb L Rev 7, 13-14 (1988).
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courts in thirty-two states ha[d] adopted public policy excep-
tions [to the at-will rule], eleven states ha[d] applied the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, and twenty-nine states
ha[d] used employee handbooks to find contractual limita-
tions on terminations.59
In addition, many states have enacted legislation to protect
workers against dismissal in a variety of circumstances. For exam-
ple, twenty-two states make it unlawful to dismiss an employee in
retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim.6 0 Thirty-four
states have given legislative protection for whistle-blowers, and
forty-two states regulate the administration of employment-related
lie detector tests."1 The state of Montana has adopted a Compre-
hensive Unjust Dismissal law that gives workers protection against
wrongful dismissal.2
The trend of state protection of individual employment rights
is evident in other areas as well. Many states have protected the
privacy of workers by restricting the use of drug testing in the
workplace.6 3 Some states have adopted more stringent protection
for the employment rights of minorities than has the federal gov-
ernment, 4 and some have used their criminal laws to police indus-
trial health and safety violations that the federal authorities have
been unwilling to remedy.6 5 In addition, some states have enacted
statutes to protect employees in the event of corporate takeovers.6
19 Id (citing Individual Employment Rights Manual, 9A Lab Rel Rptr (BNA) 505: 51-
52 (Jan 1988)).
10 Compiled from Individual Employment Rights Manual, 9A Lab Rel Rptr (BNA)
540-92 (1991).
61 Id. Of these, statutes in nine states give protection only to public employees.
02 Mont Code Ann §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-914 (1991).
13 Scott S. Cairns and Carolyn V. Grady, Drug Testing in the Workplace: A Reasoned
Approach for Private Employers, 12 Geo Mason U L Rev 491, 520-30 (1990); Judith M.
Janssen, Substance Abuse Testing and the Workplace: A Private Employer's Perspective,
12 Geo Mason U L Rev 611, 636-39 (1990). See generally, 9A Lab Rel Rptr (BNA) at 540-92
(cited in note 60).
0" See Charles C. Heckscher, The New Unionism: Employee Involvement in the
Changing Corporation 160 (Basic, 1988).
65 See, for example, Comment, State Prosecutions for Safety-Related Crimes in the
Workplace: Can D.A.'s Succeed Where OSHA Failed?, 79 Ky L J 139, 140 (1990-91); Com-
ment, State Criminal Prosecutions: Putting Teeth in the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 12 Geo Mason U L Rev 737, 738-39 (1990); Rebecca S. Webber, The OSH Act and
State Criminal Law: A Prosecutor's Brief, 25 Crim L Bulletin 234 (1989).
00 In the 1980s, more than half of the states enacted statutes that permitted corporate
directors to consider the effect of takeovers or mergers on employees. For a list of these
stakeholder statutes, see Appendix, 21 Stetson L Rev 279 (1991). See generally Steven M.H.
Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes and Formulation
of Director Duties, 21 Stetson L Rev 163, 163-65 (1991) (describing statutes); Katherine
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The increased state protection for individual workers in the
past decade seems paradoxical in light of the deterioration of the
federal protection for collective labor rights. However, the paradox
disappears if we see that the emerging regime of individual em-
ployee rights represents not a complement to or an embellishment
of the regime of collective rights, but rather its replacement.
Viewed in this light, the emerging individual rights constitute a
new system for organizing labor relations, one that is distinct from
and opposed to the New Deal system of collective bargaining.
III. THE SECTION 301 PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The New Deal system of collective bargaining, as it has been
interpreted, is a distinctively privatized system. The aim of the
NLRA is to provide a framework within which labor and manage-
ment can negotiate the terms of their mutual dealings, free from
outside interference; it is not to interfere with the substantive out-
comes of the bargaining process.67 This privatized form of collec-
tive bargaining has rendered collective bargaining legally incom-
patible with the emerging system of individual employment rights.
In order to see this dynamic, it is necessary to examine the labor
law doctrine of § 301 preemption.
Federal preemption of state statutory and common law is, of
course, a fundamental aspect of our federal system. The
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that when a fed-
eral law and a state law conflict, federal law prevails. 8 In the labor
Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency
Statutes, 21 Stetson L Rev 45, 45-47 (1991) (same); David Millon, Redefining Corporate
Law, 24 Ind L Rev 223, 240-46 (1991) (noting the proliferation of state statutes permitting
directors to pursue non-shareholder interests). The Connecticut stakeholder statute goes
further than the others by requiring directors to consider employees' interests. See Conn
Gen Stat Ann § 33-313(e) (West, 1991) ("For purposes of [making decisions with respect to
mergers, consolidations, sales of assets, and business combinations with interested share-
holders], a director of a corporation ... shall consider ... the interests of the corporation's
employees .... ).
In addition, two states have enacted statutes that require a corporate purchaser to
honor its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. See 19 Del Code Ann § 706 (1990);
Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 149, § 20E (West, 1991).
" According to Dean Harry Shulman, the NLRA established a "bare legal framework
[that] is hardly an encroachment on the premise that wages and other conditions of employ-
ment be left to autonomous determination by employers and labor." Harry Shulman, Rea-
son, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 Harv L Rev 999, 1000 (1955). See also NLRB
v American National Insurance Co., 343 US 395, 402 (1952) ("The [NLRA] does not com-
pel any agreement whatsoever between employees and employers. Nor does the Act regulate
the substantive terms governing wages, hours and working conditions which are incorpo-
rated in an agreement.").
" The Supremacy Clause provides:
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field, the potential for preemption is particularly vast. Federal la-
bor laws touch on many aspects of labor-management relations
and thus potentially preempt many types of state regulations, in-
cluding state trespass, antitrust, defamation, and property laws.6 9
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act makes
collective bargaining agreements enforceable in a federal court.7 0
Because many state employment rights duplicate, parallel, or im-
plicate aspects of collective bargaining agreements, a § 301 pre-
emption question is presented whenever a unionized employee at-
tempts to vindicate a state-created employment right in a judicial
forum.7 1
When a claim is preempted under § 301, there are two practi-
cal consequences. First, the Supreme Court has held that any and
all claims for breach of a collective bargaining agreement that are
even arguably subject to an arbitration clause must be decided in
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
US Const, Art VI.
'! See, for example, Teamsters Union v Oliver, 358 US 283, 295-97 (1959) (NLRA
preempts Ohio antitrust law that would wholly defeat the congressional purposes behind the
NLRA). Compare Farmer v United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 430 US 290, 301-
02 (1977) (NLRA does not preempt tort action in state court by a union member against his
union for damages from intentional infliction of emotional distress); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v
San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 US 180, 199-207 (1978) (NLRA does not
preempt state jurisdiction over an employer's action to enforce state trespass laws against
union picketing).
70 Section 301 says, in part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce... may be brought in any dis-
trict court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 USC § 185(a) (1988).
71 There are many other preemption issues that arise in the course of applying the
NLRA in the face of various state laws that affect employment relations. See, for example,
San Diego Building Trades Council v Garmon, 359 US 236, 245 (1959) (state court jurisdic-
tion preempted if an activity was arguably prohibited or arguably protected by federal law);
Lodge 76, International Ass'n of Machinists v Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
427 US 132, 149-51 (1976) (state regulation preempted when it interferes with the balance of
economic weapons established by Congress, even though federal labor law did not prohibit
the regulation). See William B. Gould IV, et al, When State and Federal Laws Collide:
Preemption-Nightmare or Opportunity?, 9 Indus Rel L J 4, 5-6 (1987).
Here I am only focusing on one type of preemption-preemption of state laws by § 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act. More so than other types of labor law preemption,
§ 301 preemption most directly controls the interaction between the emerging state individ-
ual employment rights and the federal system of collective bargaining.
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arbitration, rather than by a court.72 It has also adopted an ex-
tremely narrow standard for judicial review of the arbitration deci-
sions."3 In practice, this means that once a claim is preempted
under § 301, the employee's only recourse is private arbitration. As
a result, unionized workers find that, by virtue of the combination
of Section 301 preemption rules and their collective bargaining
agreements, they do not have access to any court to assert their
state law claims.
Second, and perhaps more significantly, when a claim is pre-
empted under § 301, the state law rights are extinguished. In arbi-
tration, the arbitrator applies the law of the collective agreement,
not the external state law which the employee initially sought to
invoke.7 4 Thus the unionized employee whose state law claim is
71 United Steelworkers of America v American Mfg. Co., 363 US 564, 567-58 (1960) (on
motion to compel arbitration, judicial role limited to determining whether the plaintiff has
asserted "a claim which on its face is governed by the contract"); United Steelworkers of
America v Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 US 574, 582-83 (1960) (announcing pre-
sumption of arbitrability).
" United Paperworkers Int'l Union v Misco, Inc., 484 US 29, 36 (1987) ("[C]ourts are
not authorized to reconsider the merits of an [arbitral] award even though the parties may
allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract.");
United Steelworkers of America v Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 US 593, 597 (1960)
(upholding arbitral award "so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement").
In addition, employees are required to exhaust their arbitration remedies under the
agreement before coming to court. Republic Steel Corp. v Maddox, 379 US 650, 652-53
(1965). And, unless the complaint includes an allegation that the union breached its duty of
fair representation, finality clauses in a collective agreement preclude judicial consideration
of a breach of contract claim once arbitration is completed. Hines v Anchor Motor Freight,
Inc., 424 US 554, 567 (1976). Even in the absence of an express finality clause, courts defer
to the decision of the arbitrator. Enterprise Wheel, 363 US at 596.
"' Warrior & Gulf, 363 US at 582. Most commentators agree that when a contract does
not mention external law, an arbitrator may not base his decisions upon his understanding
of the requirements of external law. The role of the arbitrator is to interpret the collective
agreement, not to apply external law. See, for example, Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial
Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny,
75 Mich L Rev 1137, 1140-43 (1977); Harry T. Edwards, Labor Arbitration at the Cross-
roads: The 'Common Law of the Shop' vs. External Law, 32 Arb J 65, 90-91 (1977); David
E. Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, in Barbara D. Dennis and Gerald
G. Somers, eds, Proceedings of the 29th Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbi-
trators 97, 110-11 (BNA, 1976); Bernard D. Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law,
and Labor Arbitration, 34 U Chi L Rev 545, 557 (1967).
To the contrary, some commentators have argued that every collective bargaining
agreement should be presumed to include all applicable law, and thus the arbitrator must
consider external law in order to interpret the contract. See, for example, Robert G. Howl-
ett, The Arbitrator, the NLRB, and the Courts, in Dallas L. Jones, ed, Proceedings of the
20th Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators 67, 83 (BNA, 1967); Dennis
0. Lynch, Deferral, Waiver, and Arbitration Under the NLRA: From Status to Contract
and Back Again, 44 U Miami L Rev 237, 270-71 (1989). This position has not prevailed.
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preempted receives neither the benefit of a judicial forum nor the
benefit of the substantive provisions of the state employment right.
In the sections that follow, I demonstrate that the federal
courts have adopted a very broad § 301 preemption doctrine.
A. The Evolution of the Section 301 Preemption Doctrine in the
Supreme Court
1. The "peculiar" need for uniformity.
a) Lucas Flour (1962). Since the early 1960s, the Supreme
Court has given § 301 a broad preemptive scope. This trend began
in 1962, in a case called Local 174 Teamsters v Lucas Flour Co.75
There the Supreme Court held that when state courts decide cases
involving collective bargaining agreements, they must apply the
federal law of § 301 rather than state contract law.76 The Court
justified this broad approach to preemption on grounds that "the
subject matter of § 301(a) 'is peculiarly one that calls for uniform
law.'-77 In particular,
[t]he possibility that individual contract terms might have
different meanings under state and federal law would inevita-
bly exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and
administration of collective agreements .... [T]he process of
negotiating an agreement would be made immeasurably more
difficult by the necessity of trying to formulate contract provi-
sions in such a way as to contain the same meaning under two
or more systems of law which might someday be invoked in
enforcing the contract. Once the collective bargain was made,
the possibility of conflicting substantive interpretation under
competing legal systems would tend to stimulate and prolong
disputes as to its interpretation. 8
75 369 US 95 (1962).
71 Id at 103.
7 Id (quoting Penna. R. Co. v Public Service Comm'n, 250 US 566, 569 (1919)). A few
years earlier, in Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
348 US 437 (1955), the Supreme Court had remanded a § 301 case to the state court on the
ground that the employees had valid state law claims, and that § 301 was not intended to
permit a union to sue to enforce the rights of individuals that could be enforced elsewhere.
Id at 460-61. The Court so decided in order to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of § 301.
Id at 459-60. The Court did not address the preemption issue explicitly, but by holding as it
did, the Court ruled, sub silentio, that the state law actions were not preempted.
71 Lucas Flour, 369 US at 103-04.
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b) Avco (1968). Six years later, in Avco Corp. v Aero
Lodge No. 735,79 the Supreme Court had to determine whether §
301 preemption could provide the basis for removal jurisdiction
under 28 USC § 1441.80 In that case, an employer sued a union in
state court for breach of a no-strike clause. The employer won, and
obtained an injunction against the strike. The union tried to re-
move the action to a federal court in order to take advantage of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, a federal anti-injunction statute. The union
argued that under Lucas Flour, § 301 preempted state breach-of-
contract actions, and that the federal courts therefore had removal
jurisdiction."'
The Supreme Court agreed, granted removal, and affirmed an
order dissolving the injunction that the state court had issued.8 2 In
doing so, it overcame its usual refusal to find removal jurisdiction
in cases in which the only federal issue is raised in defense.8 3
79 390 US 557 (1968).
1* Section 1441(a) only permits removal in cases over which a federal court has original
jurisdiction. 28 USC § 1441(a) (1988).
SI Avco, 390 US at 558-60.
" Id at 560.
83 Recall that § 1441(a) only permits removal when a federal court has original jurisdic-
tion. In turn, § 1331 grants original federal jurisdiction over claims that raise a federal ques-
tion. 28 USC § 1331 (1988). The scope of federal question jurisdiction is determined by the
well-pleaded complaint rule. See Franchise Tax Board v Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 US 1, 9-12 (1983). When the complaint presents no federal issue on its face,
courts have disagreed as to what the well-pleaded complaint rule requires. Some hold that
the rule limits the courts to a scrutiny of the complaint itself to determine the existence vel
non of a federal question. Others hold that the rule requires a court to pierce the complaint
and examine the underlying cause of action. See Comment, Federal Preemption, Removal
Jurisdiction, and the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule, 51 U Chi L Rev 634, 655-66 (1984).
Under either approach, a federal defense is not, by itself, sufficient grounds for original
federal jurisdiction or removal jurisdiction. Gully v First National Bank, 299 US 109, 112-
13 (1936). Jurisdiction only exists if the plaintiff's case-in-chief involves federal law. A.
Mark Segreti, Jr., The Federal Preemption Question-A Federal Question? An Analysis of
Federal Jurisdiction Over Supremacy Clause Issues, 33 Cleve St L Rev 653, 666-67 (1984-
85). Compare Donald L. Doernberg, There's No Reason For It; It's Just Our Policy: Why
the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdic-
tion, 38 Hastings L J 597, 621-26 (until 1894 federal courts found removal jurisdiction on
the basis of a federal defense).
However, the issue of preemption poses a special problem for removal jurisdiction and
the well-pleaded complaint rule. Preemption is normally pleaded as a defense. But when
established, preemption renders the cause of action federal. See Comment, 51 U Chi L Rev
at 657-58; Comment, Artful Pleading and Removal Jurisdiction: Ferreting Out the True
Nature of a Claim, 35 UCLA L Rev 315, 330-31 (1987). The Supreme Court addressed this
problem in Franchise Tax Board, 463 US at 13-22, noting that, in general, the defense of
preemption does not confer federal jurisdiction.
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2. Complete vs. partial preemption.
a) Franchise Tax Board (1983). Later, in a non-labor case
called Franchise Tax Board v Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust,s4 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the broad preemptive scope
of § 301 announced in Lucas Flour and Avco. In particular, the
Court explained its Avco decision:
The necessary ground of decision was that the pre-emptive
force of § 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state
cause of action "for violation of contracts between an em-
ployer and a labor organization." Any such suit is purely a
creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state
law would provide a cause of action in the absence of § 301.85
Thus Avco, as interpreted in Franchise Tax Board, said that some
claims of preemption would give rise to removal jurisdiction, while
others would not. Jurisdiction is appropriate when the federal in-
terest is so powerful as to completely eclipse the state law claim.
Section 301, the Court said, involved one such powerful federal
interest.
The Court in Franchise Tax Board called this the "complete
preemption" doctrine, "an independent corollary of the well
pleaded complaint rule."8 6 Under this corollary, a claim involving
interpretation or enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement
is so completely a federal claim that it is converted into a § 301
claim from its inception, even if alternative causes of action are
pleaded in the complaint.8 7 The complete preemption corollary to
the well-pleaded complaint rule has been applied primarily, if not
exclusively, in cases raising claims preempted by § 301.88 Thus the
8' 463 US 1 (1983) (refusing to find removal jurisdiction in a state attachment action
where preemption was raised in defense).
Id at 23 (footnotes omitted).
8' Id at 22.
Id at 23-24 (citing Avco for the proposition that "if a federal cause of action com-
pletely pre-empts a state cause of action any complaint that comes within the scope of the
federal cause of action necessarily 'arises under' federal law"). See Caterpillar, Inc. v Wil-
liams, 482 US 386, 393-94 (1987) (discussing the application of complete preemption to §
301); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v Taylor, 481 US 58, 65 (1987) (noting that § 301 has
"extraordinary pre-emptive power"). See also Comment, 51 U Chi L Rev at 661 (cited in
note 83) ("After Franchise Tax Board, however, where federal law has 'completely pre-
empted' the state law cause of action, it is proper to recharacterize the action as one that
actually arises under federal law, despite the plaintiff's usual mastery over his complaint.").
88 Metropolitan, 481 US at 63-64 ("One corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule ...
is that Congress may so completely pre-empt a particular area that any civil complaint rais-
ing this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character. For 20 years, this Court
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complete preemption doctrine has extended even further the pre-
emptive reach of § 301.
b) Allis-Chalmers (1985). In recent years, the Supreme
Court has continued to give § 301 a broad preemptive scope. In
1985, in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v Lueck, 9 an employee had suffered
a nonoccupational injury that qualified him for disability benefits
under the terms of his collective bargaining agreement. However,
the employer had harassed the employee about his insurance claim
and had instructed the insurer to terminate the disability pay-
ments. The employee sued the employer under a Wisconsin law
that made it a tort to handle an insurance claim wrongfully and in
bad faith. The lower state court found that the claim was pre-
empted by § 301.90 The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed. It
said that the suit was not preempted by § 301 because it raised a
tort claim of bad faith, not a contract claim, so that the collective
bargaining agreement was irrelevant. 1 The defendants sought Su-
preme Court review.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tort claim was
preempted under § 301. First, the Court reviewed the history of
§ 301 preemption and reaffirmed the Lucas Flour principle: Be-
cause of the need for uniformity and predictability in the interpre-
tation of collective bargaining agreements, § 301 must be given a
broad preemptive scope.92 The Court then said:
[W]hen resolution of a state-law claim is substantially depen-
dent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made be-
tween the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either
be treated as a § 301 claim,... or dismissed as pre-empted by
federal labor-contract law.93
The Court also said that § 301 would preempt such a state law
claim whether it was pleaded in contract or in tort:
has singled out claims preempted by § 301 of the LMRA for such special treatment."
(emphasis added)). See also Adkins v General Motors Corp., 946 F2d 1201, 1207 (6th Cir
1991), cert denied, 60 USLW 3537 (May 18, 1992). ("The complete preemption corollary...
is applied primarily in cases raising claims preempted by LMRA § 301.") petition for cert
filed, 60 USLW 3537 (Jan 13, 1992).
471 US 202 (1985).
' Id at 203-06. The Wisconsin appeals court also found the claim preempted by other
provisions of the federal labor law, id at 206 & n 3, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court dis-
agreed. Id at 207. This issue was not presented for review by the Supreme Court. Id at 208.
9 Id at 207.
92 Id at 209-11.
93 Id at 220 (citation omitted).
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[Q]uestions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement
agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow
from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by refer-
ence to uniform federal law, whether such questions arise in
the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging
liability in tort. Any other result would elevate form over sub-
stance and allow parties to evade the requirements of § 301 by
relabeling their contract claims as claims for tortious breach
of contract.94
Applying this doctrine to the facts before it, the Court rea-
soned that the collective agreement could contain implied terms
defining the employer's duty to pay insurance benefits. It con-
cluded that "[t]he duties imposed and rights established through
the state tort thus derive[d] from the rights and obligations estab-
lished by the contract."9
In addition, the Court found that the state tort alleged was
"derived from the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
found in every contract."' Because the state law right that the
plaintiff asserted "not only derive[d] from the contract, but [wa]s
defined by the contractual obligation of good faith, any attempt to
assess liability here inevitably [would] involve contract interpreta-
tion."9 Thus the Court held that the claim should have been dis-
missed, either for failure to exhaust the contractual arbitration
procedure (if the plaintiff's complaint were interpreted, or
amended, to assert a claim under § 301), or as preempted under
§ 301 (if the plaintiff had forgone his federal claim).98
c) Caterpillar (1987). Two years later, however, in Cater-
pillar Inc. v Williams, the Supreme Court held that an employee's
claim for breach of an individual employment contract was not
completely preempted by § 301.91 In that case, employees claimed
that their employer had breached a contract they had signed
before they were in the bargaining unit or covered by the collective
"' Id at 211.
"' Id at 217.
86 Id.
9 Id at 218.
88 Id at 220-21 (citing Maddox, 379 US at 652). On the disposition of cases in which a
state court finds federal preemption, see Comment, 35 UCLA L Rev at 353 & n 181 (cited in
note 83).
" 482 US 386, 396-97 (1987). The Court said, in dicta, that the defendant could raise,
as a defense in state court, that plaintiff's action was preempted by other provisions of the
NLRA. Id at 397-98.
[59:575
Industrial Pluralism
bargaining agreement. They brought their claims in state court.
The employer attempted to create a federal issue by arguing in
defense that the collective bargaining agreement included a waiver
of any pre-existing individual contractual rights.100 On this basis,
the employer removed the action to federal court and moved to
have it dismissed, as a § 301 action, for failure to exhaust contrac-
tual remedies.
The federal district court found removal jurisdiction and dis-
missed. The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed, finding that the
complaint did not arise under § 301, so that the federal courts did
not have removal jurisdiction.101 The Supreme Court affirmed.
While acknowledging the broad preemptive scope of § 301, the
Court refused to find preemption because the employees' com-
plaint had not relied upon the collective bargaining agreement.
Further, the Court found that the individual contractual rights
upon which they had relied did not depend on an interpretation of
the collective agreement.0 2 The Court also rejected the employer's
effort to "inject[] a federal question into an action that asserts
what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into one
arising under federal law, [and] thereby select[] the forum in
which the claim shall be litigated."103
Unfortunately, the Court did not explain why the employer's
argument in Caterpillar that the collective agreement limited the
employer's obligation to the plaintiff was a mere defense, while in
Allis-Chalmers, the employer's argument that the collective agree-
ment limited or qualified its obligation to pay medical insurance
preempted the plaintiff's claim. The opinions in Allis-Chalmers
and Caterpillar thus created uncertainty as to whether § 301 pre-
empted state law claims by employees to which the employer ar-
gued in defense that the case was dependent upon an implied term
or waiver in a collective bargaining agreement. This type of pre-
emption issue regularly arises when a unionized employee brings a
state law wrongful discharge claim.
Some judges attempted to reconcile Caterpillar and Allis-
Chalmers by interpreting Caterpillar as addressing only a question
of § 1441 removal jurisdiction, not the substantive issue of preemp-
300 Id at 388-90.
'10 Id at 390-91.
302 Id at 395.
103 Id.
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tion under § 301.104 That is, they reasoned that the complete pre-
emption doctrine does not mean that all cases that are preempted
under § 301 give rise to removal jurisdiction. Under this view, Cat-
erpillar does not alter the standard for determining when an em-
ployer's defense creates removal jurisdiction, but it does mean that
there is a stricter standard for asserting removal jurisdiction under
§ 1441 than for finding substantive preemption under § 301. Thus
one court spoke of "the possibility that the Caterpillar plaintiffs'
claims were partially preempted.1 0 5
The partial preemption theory has a serious flaw: How could a
federal court not have removal jurisdiction over a claim that is
completely preempted by § 301? If complete preemption means
what it says-that § 301 displaces all state causes of action and
converts an otherwise ordinary state law action into a § 301 action
from its inception'0°-then the claim must involve a federal ques-
tion, and removal jurisdiction must exist.
Most courts and commentators have rejected the partial pre-
emption interpretation-of Caterpillar. Instead, they view Caterpil-
lar as limiting both substantive preemption under § 301 and re-
moval jurisdiction under § 1441 in cases in which the employer
raises a defense based on the collective bargaining agreement."0 7
Indeed, the only circuit that has specifically embraced the partial
preemption interpretation of Caterpillar-the Sixth Circuit in Ad-
kins-noted that the claims which were preempted, but did not
give rise to removal jurisdiction, were preempted by other provi-
sions of the labor law, not by § 301.108
In other words, the tension between Allis-Chalmers's broader
§ 301 preemption and Caterpillar's narrower approach cannot so
easily be resolved. However, the Court subsequently has indicated
104 See, for example, Adkins, 946 F2d at 1207-08 (interpreting Caterpillar as a case of
partial exemption); Schacht v Caterpillar, Inc., 213 Ill App 3d 169, 571 NE2d 1215, 1217
(1991) (noting that "the issue in [Caterpillar] was removal jurisdiction, not the substantive
merits of a pre-emption defense."), cert denied, 112 S Ct 1306 (1992). See also Richard E.
Schwartz and James E. Parrot, A New Look at Federal Labor Law Preemption: Unionized
Employees' Claims in State Court, 7 St Louis U Pub L Rev 297, 305 (1988) (noting the
difficulty in reconciling Allis-Chalmers and Caterpillar).
10' Adkins, 946 F2d at 1208.
10' Caterpillar, 482 US at 393.
107 See, for example, McCormick v AT&T Technologies, Inc., 934 F2d 531, 534 (4th Cir
1991) (en banc), cert denied, 112 S Ct 912 (1992) (standard for § 301 preemption same as
standard for removal jurisdiction). Accord Berda v CBS, Inc., 881 F2d 20, 23-24, 26 (3d Cir
1989). See also Schwartz and Parrot, 7 St Louis U Pub L Rev at 305 (cited in note 104)
("[Caterpillar] made it clear that defensive federalization of a claim is no longer
permitted.").
10' Adkins, 946 F2d at 1208.
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that it favors the broader preemptive scope that Allis-Chalmers
exemplified.
3. Recent decisions broadening the scope of preemption.
a) Hechler (1987). In 1987, the Supreme Court decided a
case that posed the question of whether an employee's tort claim
against her union was preempted under § 301. In International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v Hechler, an injured employee
sued her union in state court for breaching its implied duty to en-
sure its members a safe workplace. 10 9 The Supreme Court found
the claim preempted because it was not "sufficiently independent
of the collective-bargaining agreement to withstand the pre-emp-
tive force of § 301. ''110 The Court reasoned that, under Florida law,
a union had no independent duty to provide a safe workplace; the
union only could have assumed such a duty under a collective bar-
gaining agreement. Thus to decide liability, the court would have
to interpret the collective agreement to determine whether the
union undertook such a duty. 1 ' In short, this decision, like Allis-
Chalmers, affirmed the broad preemptive scope of § 301.
b) Lingle (1988). In 1988, the Supreme Court again ad-
dressed the question of the scope of § 301 preemption. In Lingle v
Norge Division of Magic Chef, an employee had brought a state
law tort claim against her employer, alleging that she had been
fired in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim." 2 The
lower court had found that the claim was preempted, because the
employee had been covered by a collective bargaining agreement,
and because the facts underlying the tort of retaliatory discharge
would have been the same as for a grievance under the just cause
provision of the collective bargaining agreement." 3
The Supreme Court reversed. It rejected the argument that
factual parallelism between a state claim and a grievance automa-
tically renders the state law claim preempted. Rather, "as long as
the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agree-
ment itself, the claim is 'independent' of the agreement for § 301
109 481 US 851, 853 (1987).
110 Id at 859.
m Id at 859-62.
112 486 US 399, 401 (1988).
113 By the time the Seventh Circuit decided the case, Lingle had successfully arbitrated
her claim and received reinstatement with back pay. Lingle v Norge Division of Magic Chef,
Inc., 823 F2d 1031, 1034 (7th Cir 1987).
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pre-emption purposes."114 The Court concluded: "[A]n application
of state law is pre-empted by § 301 . . .only if such application
requires the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.' 1 5
The Court held that the state court could resolve the retaliation
claim without reference to the collective agreement, so there was
no § 301 preemption.
While the Court in Lingle did not preempt the claim of retali-
atory discharge, the case did not directly address the question of
whether § 301 would preempt a state law claim to which an em-
ployer interposed a contractual defense. However, one commenta-
tor has noted that the language of Lingle is a subtle but important
departure from Allis-Chalmers, which said that only claims that
were "substantially dependent" on the collective agreement were
preempted." 6 She argues that the above-quoted language of Lingle
suggests that if a court must interpret a collective agreement to
resolve any aspect of a case-the plaintiff's case-in-chief or the de-
fense-then the plaintiff's claim is preempted."' Indeed, she sug-
gests that, after Lingle, employers need only assert a colorable con-
tractual defense in order to supplant the state court's
jurisdiction.' " If she is right, then the Lingle test will result in
more preemption than did either Allis-Chalmers or Caterpillar."9
"' Lingle, 486 US at 410.
15 Id at 413.
Note, The Need for a New Approach to Federal Preemption of Union Members'
State Law Claims, 99 Yale L J 209 (1989). The Eighth Circuit adopted this interpretation of
Lingle in Hanks v General Motors Corp., 859 F2d 67, 70 (8th Cir 1988):
Lingle makes plain ... that the defenses as well as the claims, must be considered in
determining whether resolution of the state law claims requires construing the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. The factual background of the entire case must be ex-
amined against an analysis of the state tort claim and a determination made whether
the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement come into play.
But see Newberry v Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F2d 1142, 1146-47 (9th Cir 1988) (finding no
distinction between the Lingle and the Allis-Chalmers tests).
.. Note, 99 Yale L J at 210 (cited in note 116). Footnote 12 in Lingle said that not
every claim "tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement is pre-
empted." 486 US at 413 n 12 (quoting Allis-Chalmers, 471 US at 211). The Court gave as a
hypothetical example a state law claim that necessitated a look at the collective agreement
to determine the back pay to which the claimant was entitled. Id. The Court said that the
need to consult the agreement to determine back pay would not, standing alone, preempt
the claim. Id. The extreme narrowness of this exception lends support to the argument that
Lingle gave a broader scope to § 301 preemption than did Allis-Chalmers.
18 Note, 99 Yale L J at 209-11 (cited in note 116).
"' Id at 209. See also Labor Arbitration and the Law of Collective Bargaining, 7 Labor
Law 747, 755-61 (1991) (during 1990, after Lingle, the trend was toward more preemption
under § 301). But see Note, Labor Law Preemption Under Section 301: New Rules for an
Old Game, 40 Syracuse L Rev 1279, 1291-93 (1989) (arguing that the Lingle test limited the
preemptive scope of the Allis-Chalmers test). See also Note, Federal Labor Law Preemp-
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B. A Topology of the Section 301 Doctrine in the Lower Federal
Courts
Whether or not Lingle has brought about more instances of
§ 301 preemption, it certainly has not simplified the preemption
doctrine. Just last year, the Ninth Circuit termed § 301 preemp-
tion a "thicket," a "tangled and confusing interplay between fed-
eral and state law," 120 and "one of the most confused areas of fed-
eral court litigation." '121 However, despite this apparent confusion,
lower federal courts have shown a strong tendency, both before
and after Lingle, to find unionized workers' state law claims
preempted. 2 '
There are two distinct methods of reasoning that courts em-
ploy in deciding § 301 preemption cases, both of which are heavily
tilted in favor of preemption. One method is to find preemption on
the basis of a contract-interpretation issue raised by the employer
in defense. Often such defenses are based on general contract pro-
visions to which the employer urges an expansive interpretation.
For example, one court has found a contractual provision granting
an employer the right to make "reasonable rules and regulations
from time to time" sufficient to preempt an employee's right to be
free of drug testing under state law.2 3 Other courts have found
tion of State Wrongful Discharge Claims, 58 U Cin L Rev 491, 526-27 (1989) (arguing that
Lingle opened the door to union workers' state law suits).
120 Galvez v Kuhn, 933 F2d 773, 774 (9th Cir 1991).
121 Id at 776 (quoting Note, 99 Yale L J at 209 (cited in note 116)). See also Singh v
Lunalilo, 6 IER Cases (BNA) 1682, 1684 (D Hawaii 1991) (on difficulty of reconciling the
"dozens, if not hundreds, of federal cases addressing the issue of the scope of section 301
pre-emption on [sic] state law claims.").
122 See notes 128-35 and accompanying text. See also Note, 58 U Cin L Rev at 555
(cited in note 119) (arguing that all wrongful discharge claims of unionized workers are pre-
empted by § 301). But see Jane Byeff Korn, Collective Rights and Individual Remedies:
Rebalancing the Balance After Lingle, 41 Hastings L J 1149, 1167 (1990) (arguing that,
after Lingle, most employee claims based on state tort laws are not preempted).
Professor Korn concludes that Lingle opened the door for unionized employees to by-
pass their grievance procedures and bring a host of lawsuits in the state courts. 41 Hastings
L J at 1165. My research reaches the opposite conclusion. Indeed, I believe that her research
does too. Of the twenty-six cases cited by Korn in notes 53, 85, and 108 as the basis for her
claim, twelve were cases involving retaliation for filing of workers' compensation claims, the
precise issue decided by the Supreme Court in Lingle. In those cases, it is not at all surpris-
ing that the lower courts followed the Supreme Court's ruling in Lingle. Of the remaining
fourteen cases Professor Korn cites, twelve were cases in which the state law claims were
preempted by federal law, so that the unionized worker could not maintain the state court
action. Thus, if one exempts the Lingle fact-pattern, only two of Professor Korn's twenty-
six cases cited were cases in which the unionized worker was permitted to sue in state court.
I Jackson v Liquid Carbonic Corp., 863 F2d 111, 113-15 (1st Cir 1988) (employee's
claim preempted by the collective bargaining agreement, which contained a standard man-
agement rights clause giving the company the "right to post reasonable rules and regulations
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preemption on the basis of implied contract clauses or novel read-
ings of explicit ones. 124
The other method is to find preemption by interpretation of
state law. By this method, a court first looks to see whether an
asserted state law employment right is waivable under state law.125
If it is, then theoretically the court should look to see if the em-
ployee in fact waived the right in a clause of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. However, this exercise requires the court to inter-
pret the collective agreement, something which courts are
extremely reluctant to do. 26 Instead they preempt the claim be-
cause to decide whether the state law claim was actually waived,
the court would have to interpret the collective bargaining agree-
ment. Hence, by this method, a state employment right that is
waivable is automatically preempted. 27
A survey of recent preemption cases reveals a very broad ten-
dency for courts to preempt unionized workers' state law claims.
Indeed, with very few exceptions, courts always preempt unionized
workers' attempts to assert state law employment rights. The
from time to time"). See also Utility Workers of America v Southern California Edison Co.,
852 F2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir 1988) (constitutional claims preempted by contractual language
that granted the company the right to manage the plant, direct the work force, and imple-
ment safety rules); Schlacter-Jones v General Telephone, 936 F2d 435, 439 (9th Cir 1991)
(employee's claims preempted because they were "inextricably intertwined" with analysis of
the collective bargaining agreement, which governed working conditions at the company).
124 See, for example, McCormick, 934 F2d at 536 (holding that plaintiff's claim against
an employer involved "implied rights and duties" in the collective bargaining agreement,
and thus the claims required interpretation of the agreement and were preempted); Jones v
General Motors Corp., 939 F2d 380, 383 (6th Cir 1991) (§ 301 preemption not limited to
cases where the precise meaning of words in the collective bargaining agreement is the crux
of the state-based claim); Laws v Calmat, 852 F2d 430 (9th Cir 1988) (drug testing claims
preempted on the basis of implied terms).
"I For example, in Lingle, the Supreme Court found that the Illinois state-law right
not to be fired for filing a workers' compensation claim was not waivable. 486 US at 409 & n
9. Thus it found that the collective bargaining agreement could not have modified the state
law right. Id. See also Local No. 57, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumb-
ing v Bechtel Power Corp., 834 F2d 884, 889-90 (10th Cir 1987) (no preemption because
anti-blacklisting provisions of Utah Constitution not waivable); Tellez v Pacific Gas and
Electric, 817 F2d 536, 538 (9th Cir 1987) (no preemption because state right not negotiable).
128 See Warrior & Gulf, 363 US at 582 (arbitrators, not courts, should interpret collec-
tive bargaining agreements).
17 See, for example, Hyles v Mensing, 849 F2d 1213, 1216-17 (9th Cir 1988) (preempt-
ing claims of emotional distress and defamation because they did not involve nonnegotiable
state right); Laws, 852 F2d at 433 & n 4; Utility Workers, 852 F2d at 1086 (right to be free
of drug testing, located in California's state constitution's privacy guarantee, can be waived).
See also Angel Gomez III, Preemption and Preclusion of Employee Common Law Rights by
Federal and State Statutes, 11 Indus Rel L J 45, 51 n 42 (1989) (discussing the waiver issue
in Utility Workers and Laws).
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broad trend, as well as the narrow exceptions, are apparent when
we break the cases down into categories.
1. Claims that usually are preempted.
A great many of the developments in state employment law
have been in the area of wrongful discharge. Unionized workers
have been particularly disadvantaged in this area by the preemp-
tion rules. 128 In general, the following types of claims by employees
against employers are almost.always preempted:
1. unjust dismissal claims alleging breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing;129
2. unjust dismissal claims alleging a tort of wrongful
discharge;'30
3. unlawful drug testing claims; 13
1
4. claims that the employer breached a promise to an em-
ployee who was a member of a bargaining unit;'3 2
,28 Anthony Herman, Wrongful Discharge Actions after Leuck and Metropolitan Life
Insurance: The Erosion of Individual Rights and Collective Strength?, 9 Indus Rel L J 596,
639-40 (1987). See also Daniel N. Kosanovich, Inching Through the Maze: Recent Develop-
ments in Preemption Under the NLRA and the Impact of Caterpillar, Hechler, and Others,
4 Labor Law 225, 253-54 (1988) (claims involving tort of wrongful discharge or contract
breach routinely preempted).
I" See, for example, Bloom v Universal City Studios, 734 F Supp 1553, 1560 (C D Cal
1990), aff'd without opinion, 933 F2d 1013 (9th Cir 1991); Fox v Parker Hannifin Corp., 914
F2d 795, 801 (6th Cir 1990); Cook v Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F2d 233, 238-39 (9th Cir
1990); Newberry v Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F2d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir 1988); Paige v Henry
J. Kaiser Co., 826 F2d 857, 866 (9th Cir 1987); Harper v San Diego Transit Corp., 764 F2d
663, 668-69 (9th Cir 1985); Taylor v St. Regis Paper Co., 560 F Supp 546, 549 (C D Cal
1983).
'10 See, for example, Singh, 6 IER Cases (BNA) at 1682, 1686-87; Cook, 911 F2d at
237-38; Hanks v General Motors Corp., 859 F2d 67, 69 (8th Cir 1988); Kirby v Allegheny
Beverage Corp., 811 F2d 253, 256 (4th Cir 1987); Desoto v Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 811
F2d 1333, 1135-36 (9th Cir 1987); Durrette v UGI Corp., 674 F Supp 1139, 1143 (M D Pa
1987); Crocker v Synpol, Inc., 732 SW2d 429, 432-33 (Tex App 1987); Nelson v Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp., 648 F Supp 44, 47 (D Mont 1986); Hohn v Kaiser Cement Corp.,
624 F Supp 549, 551-52 (D Mont 1986); Evangelista v Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pa-
cific, 777 F2d 1390, 1400-01 (9th Cir 1985); Mitchell v Pepsi-Cola Bottlers Inc., 772 F2d
342, 344-45 (7th Cir 1985); Faust v RCA Corp., 612 F Supp 540, 542 (M D Pa 1985); Taylor,
560 F Supp at 549.
' See, for example, Schlacter-Jones, 936 F2d at 440-42; Jackson, 863 F2d at 118-20;
Utility Workers, 852 F2d at 1086-87; Laws, 852 F2d at 432-33; Strachan v Union Oil Co.,
768 F2d 703, 705 (5th Cir 1985).
122 The claims are preempted whether the plaintiff pleads the breach of promise as a
breach of contract, misrepresentation, promissory fraud, or promissory estoppel. See, for
example, Dougherty v AT&T, 902 F2d 201, 204 (2d Cir 1990) (promise of job security); Fox,
914 F2d at 801-02 (promise to investigate harassment by co-workers); Ulrich v Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Co., 884 F2d 936, 938 (6th Cir 1989) (promise of right to reenter bargaining
unit after transferring to supervisory position); Terwilleger v Greyhound Lines, Inc., 882
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5. claims of defamation for an employer's derogatory re-
marks about an employee made to co-workers;133
6. claims that an employer conducted an unlawful search
of a person or automobile;134
7. claims concerning the mishandling of health insurance,
medical leave, or other medical obligations.3 5
2. Claims that usually are not preempted.
On the other hand, there are a few types of claims by employ-
ees against employers which the courts almost never preempt:
1. claims of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' com-
pensation claim; 3 6
F2d 1033, 1037-38 (6th Cir 1989) (promise of job security); Bache v AT&T, 840 F2d 283,
285-86 & n 1 (5th Cir 1988) (promise of job security at new position if employee agreed to
transfer from bargaining unit); Maushund v Earl C. Smith, Inc., 795 F2d 589, 589-90 (6th
Cir 1986) (promise of job security); Mason v Continental Group, Inc., 763 F2d 1219, 1222-24
(11th Cir 1985) (promise to keep plant open); Eitmann v New Orleans Public Service, Inc.,
730 F2d 359, 362-63 (5th Cir 1984) (promise of full compensation during period of disabil-
ity). See also Schacht, 571 NE2d at 1218 (individual written apprenticeship contracts). But
see Wells v General Motors, 881 F2d 166, 172-75 (5th Cir 1989) (no preemption of fraud
and misrepresentation claims regarding promise that laid-off employees would be eligible for
reemployment).
"I See, for example, Strachan, 768 F2d at 706 (state law defamation claims are pre-
empted unless plaintiff shows malice); Mitchell, 772 F2d at 348 & n 20. But see Meier v
Hamilton Standard Electronic Systems, Inc., 748 F Supp 296, 299-300 (E D Pa 1990) (de-
famatory statements not preempted if made to individuals outside the scope of the agree-
ment); Tellez, 817 F2d at 538 (holding that the agreement does not govern defamatory
statements), in which the courts refused to preempt defamation claims.
"' See, for example, Romero v Hilton Hotels Corp., 137 Labor Rel Ref Man (BNA)
2647, 2649-50 (D Hawaii 1991) (search of person); Stikes v Chevron USA, Inc., 914 F2d
1265, 1269-70 (9th Cir 1990), cert denied, 111 S Ct 2015 (1991) (search of automobile);
Kirby, 811 F2d at 256 (search of person and automobile).
"I See, for example, Perugini v Safeway Stores, 935 F2d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir 1991)
(preempting claims growing out of employer's refusal to give employee light duty during
pregnancy and instead forcing her to take medical leave); Terwilliger, 882 F2d at 1037-38
(preempting right to reemployment after medical disqualification because created by con-
tract, not state law); Brinkman v State, 224 Mont 238, 729 P2d 1301, 1308-09 (1989) (pre-
empting wrongful discharge claim arising from termination for failing to provide proper re-
quest for medical leave).
'36 Since Lingle, courts have uniformly refused to preempt claims alleging retaliation
for filing workers' compensation claims. See, for example, Krashna v Oliver Realty, Inc., 895
F2d 111, 115 (3d Cir 1990) (distinguishing'plaintiff's termination from ordinary wrongful
discharge claim because the complaint involved a course of illegal conduct that preceded the
discharge and because the plaintiff expressly alleged wrongs separate from the collective
bargaining agreement); McEwen v Delta Air Lines, Inc., 919 F2d 58, 59 (7th Cir 1990) (not
discussing preemption, but applying Illinois law); Eldridge v Felec Services, Inc., 920 F2d
1434, 1438-39 (9th Cir 1990) (holding that state law requires only a determination whether
the workers' compensation claim was the primary cause of discharge, an injury that requires
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2. claims that the employer breached a promise made to
an employee before the employee entered the bargaining
unit;'- 7
3. claims of discrimination on the basis of race, age, gen-
der, or some other protected classification. 8
What is interesting about these three categories of non-pre-
empted claims is that they all parallel specific Supreme Court deci-
no interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement); Smolarek v Chrysler Corp., 858
F2d 1165, 1168-69 (6th Cir 1988) (same). But see Magerer v John Sexton & Co., 912 F2d
525, 529-30 (1st Cir 1990) (preempting workers' compensation retaliation claim because
state statute exempts workers covered by collective bargaining agreements).
Prior to Lingle, the courts were divided on this issue. For retaliation claims that were
not preempted, see, for example, Baldracchi v Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division, 814 F2d
102, 105 (2d Cir 1987) (retaliation claim independent of agreement); Bonner v Fleming
Companies, Inc., 734 SW2d 764, 766 (Tex App 1987) (same); Sutton v Southwest Forest
Industries, Inc., 628 F Supp 1034, 1036 (D Kan 1985) (state policy of protecting workers
from retaliatory discharge for filing workers' compensation claims does not conflict with the
federal interest in protecting the collective-bargaining process); Midgett v Sackett-Chicago,
Inc., 105 Ill 2d 143, 473 NE2d 1280, 1283 (1984) ("[I]n order to provide a complete remedy
it is necessary that the victim of a retaliatory discharge be given a remedy in tort, indepen-
dent of any contract remedy the employee may have based in the collective-bargaining
agreement."). For retaliation claims that were preempted, see, for example, Richard v Port-
land General Electric, 83 Or App 59, 730 P2d 578, 579 (1986)(citing state and federal policy
of exclusivity of collective bargaining remedies); Johnson v Hussmann Corp., 610 F Supp
757, 759 (E D Mo 1985) (because the state tort law directly affects the agreement, it is
preempted); Schuyler v Metropolitan Transit Co., 374 NW2d 453, 455-56 (Minn App 1985)
(failure to exhaust grievances under federal law precluded suit for retaliatory discharge
under state law); Mouser v Granite City Steel Division of National Steel Corp., 121 Ill App
3d 834, 460 NE2d 115, 118 (5th Dist 1984) (employee cannot sue in tort separate from
collective bargaining agreement).
,17 See, for example, Berda v CBS, Inc., 881 F2d 20, 25-27 (3d Cir 1989) (pre-hire
promise of job security); Anderson v Ford Motor Co., 803 F2d 953, 958 & n 7 (8th Cir 1986)
(promise that newly-hired employees would not be bumped by employees on preferential
hiring list); Varnum v Nu-Car Carriers, Inc., 804 F2d 638, 640 (11th Cir 1986) (pre-hire
promises about potential income and job assignments). But see Bates v General Telephone
Co., 795 F2d 775, 779-80 (9th Cir 1986) (preempting suit to enforce pre-hire promises about
future benefits and job security). Angel Gomez has stated that the circuits are split over
whether to preempt claims involving pre-hire contracts. However, he refers only to Bales as
a case of preemption. Gomez, 11 Indus Rel L J at 52 & n 48 (cited in note 127).
138 See, for example, Cook, 911 F2d at 238 (religious discrimination); Smolarek, 879 F2d
at 1332-33 (handicap discrimination); Ackerman v Western Electric Co., 860 F2d 1514,
1517-18 (9th Cir 1988) (handicap discrimination); Nelson, 648 F Supp at 47 (sex discrimina-
tion); Austin v New England Telephone, 644 F Supp 763, 767 (D Mass 1986) (handicap
discrimination); Scott v New United Motor Mfg., Inc., 632 F Supp 891, 894-95 (N D Cal
1986) (race discrimination); Peoples v Pennsylvania Power and Light Co., 638 F Supp 402,
408 (M D Pa 1985) (race discrimination). See also Carrington v RCA Global Communica-
tions, 762 F Supp 632, 641 (D NJ 1991) ("Following Lingle, courts have uniformly held that
state anti-discrimination laws are not preempted by § 301 of the LMRA ... even where the
labor contract itself prohibits discrimination."). But see Laczay v Ross Adhesives, 855 F2d
351, 352 (6th Cir 1988) (describing district court action preempting allegation of violation of
Michigan Age Discrimination statute and denying right to appeal).
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sions. For example, claims for workers' compensation retaliation
involve the same issue as did Lingle, in which the Court did not
preempt the claim. Similarily, the claims for breach of pre-employ-
ment promises replicate the fact pattern in Caterpillar, which also
found no preemption. And the discrimination claims pose a similar
issue to that in Alexander v Gardner-Denver Co., another case in
which the Court did not defer to the contractual arbitration ma-
chinery."' Indeed, the Supreme Court in Lingle expressly en-
dorsed an exception to § 301 preemption for claims under state
anti-discrimination laws.4 0 Thus all three categories are narrow
exceptions to an otherwise broad preemption doctrine.'
There is one additional category of claims that are not pre-
empted: claims not cognizable under a union's grievance proce-
dure. Thus, for example, claims against persons who are not par-
ties to a collective agreement, or who are not subject to the
grievance and arbitration procedures, are rarely preempted. 4 2
Similarily, cases brought by persons who do not have access to the
grievance procedure rarely are preempted.1 3 In addition, claims
--- 415 US 36 (1974). There the Supreme Court held that an employee can maintain a
race discrimination action under the civil rights acts, even if she had previously arbitrated
the same issue. That is, the federal courts need not defer to the decision of the arbitrator in
matters involving discrimination. Id at 59-60. Deferral questions are similar but not identi-
cal to § 301 preemption questions. Section 301 preemption resolves the tension between
collectively-bargained rights and state-created individual employment rights. Deferral re-
solves the tension between collectively-bargained rights and federally-created individual
employment rights. Section 301 preemption is derived from the Supremacy Clause and thus
is constitutionally compelled. Deferral is derived from the federal courts' authority to recon-
cile and harmonize two conflicting federal statutes; it may reflect prudent judicial policy,
but it is not constitutionally compelled.
When an individual maintains a claim under state fair employment laws, the issue is
preemption rather than deferral, but the courts reach the same conclusion as in Gardner-
Denver. That is, a union's grievance procedure does not preempt a claim for discrimination
based on state law. Id at 51-52. One commentator has suggested that courts should use the
reasoning of Gardner-Denver to decide all issues of § 301 preemption, not merely those
involving discrimination. Herman, 9 Indus Rel L J at 615-16 (cited in note 128).
"o 486 US at 412-13.
"' See Singh, 6 IER Cases (BNA) at 1686 (noting exceptions to § 301 preemption for
claims alleging workers' compensation retaliation and employment discrimination).
"4 See, for example, Meier, 748 F Supp at 300-01 (defamatory statements made by
employer to persons not employed by company and not involved in investigation of em-
ployee); Dougherty v Parsec, Inc., 872 F2d 766, 770-71 (6th Cir 1989) (tortious interference
claim against client of plaintiff's employer who allegedly requested plaintiff's dismissal in
retaliation for filing an OSHA complaint, even though the employee attempted to use the
grievance procedure to protest the firing).
143 See, for example, White v National Steel Corp., 938 F2d 474, 484 (4th Cir 1991) (no
preemption because plaintiffs were not represented by union and had no access to grievance
procedure); Scott v New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc., 632 F Supp 891, 893-94 (N D
Cal 1986) (no preemption of fraud and IIED claims because plaintiff was a probationary
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arising after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement
are not preempted. 4 4 There, too, courts reason that if no grievance
and arbitration procedure is available to remedy the issue, they
should not preempt.
This last exception to the otherwise broad tendency to pre-
empt indicates the central role that union grievance and arbitra-
tion procedures play in the courts' determination of whether or not
to preempt.145 Ostensibly this factor should be irrelevant because,
under Allis-Chalmers and Lingle, it is the relationship between the
state law claim and the collective bargaining agreement that
should decide the preemption question, not the relationship be-
tween the state law claim and the means to enforce the collective
agreement. In Section IV below, I explore the logic that links the
contractual enforcement procedure and the decision by a court to
preempt.
3. Claims that sometimes are preempted and sometimes are
not.
There are also a few categories of § 301 preemption claims
that go both ways:
employee and, under the applicable collective agreement, was not entitled to file a griev-
ance). See also Caterpillar, 482 US at 395 & n 9 (no preemption for claims of employees not
covered by collective bargaining agreement). But see Young v Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc.,
830 F2d 993, 1000 & n 3 (9th Cir 1987) (preempting probationary employee's claim of
wrongful discharge even though employee was not covered by the job security terms of the
collective agreement, because the employee had access to the grievance procedure).
Professor William Gould IV critizes the Scott decision as inconsistent with The Steel-
workers Trilogy (see note 200) and the "virtues of industrial self-government." Gould, 9
Indus Rel L J at 11-12 (cited in note 71).
"4 See, for example, Overby v Chevron, USA, 132 Labor Rel Ref Man (BNA) 2334,
2337 (9th Cir 1989) (for § 301 purposes, the agreement ceases to exist when it expires, so
there can be no preemption).
'" National Steel, 938 F2d at 481 (The driving force behind the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Lueck was "not only the need for uniformity of interpretation that was identified in
Lucas Flour, but the need to preserve the central role of arbitration established in collective
bargaining contracts."); McCormick, 934 F2d at 538 ("There are few workplace quarrels that
could not be framed as some form of tortious conduct. Our holding that [the plaintiff's]
state law claims are preempted by § 301 protects the continued vitality of grievance proce-
dures as a fair and efficient means for the resolution of labor disputes, and it also furthers
the uniformity concerns underlying § 301."); Beatrice Foods, 921 F2d at 1020 ("[Tlhe hold-
ings in Allis-Chalmers and Bechtel Power are consistent with the 'Steelworkers Trilogy" [in
which the Supreme Court] stated a broad policy favoring arbitration under collective bar-
gaining agreements."); Marine Transport Lines v Int'l Organization of Masters, 609 F Supp
282, 287 (S D NY 1985) ("It was precisely the need to maintain the effectiveness of arbitra-
tion that prompted the Court in Lueck to find that a derivative tort claim was preempted
by federal law under Section 301 where the collective bargaining agreement imposed the
same rights and obligations as would the derivative tort.").
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1. claims concerning issues that were not addressed by
the collective agreement, and thus cannot be brought in
arbitration;146
2. claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress
("IED"), due to outrageous conduct by the employer; 14 7
14 Cases not preempting these claims include Meier v Hamilton Standard Electronic
Systems, Inc., 748 F Supp 296 (E D Pa 1990), in which a plaintiff alleged that his employer
falsely accused him of drug trafficking, and fired him. The plaintiff prevailed in arbitration
and was reinstated. Id at 298 n 1. Thereafter, he sued for defamation, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and various other torts. The district court refused
to preempt the defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"), and pri-
vacy claims because the grievance procedure under the union contract could not redress
such wrongs. Id at 300. See also Fox, 914 F2d at 802 (no preemption for claims of emotional
distress because unrelated to collective bargaining agreement); Wells, 881 F2d at 174-75 (no
preemption for claim of fraud because collective agreement did not address issue); Tellez,
817 F2d at 538 (no preemption for claim of defamation because collective agreement did not
envision it); Bloom, 734 F Supp at 1558 n 2 (noting exception to preemption for "claims that
concern jobs not covered by a collective bargaining agreement").
Courts preempting them include Young, 830 F2d at 997; and Truex v Garnett Freight-
lines, Inc., 784 F2d 1347, 1351 (9th Cir 1985).
Professor Gomez refers to these as claims involving conduct outside the collective bar-
gaining agreement. Gomez, 11 Indus Rel L J at 53-54 (cited in note 127), and notes that this
is a "highly limited" exception to preemption. Id at 53. His evidence supports mine: that
claims involving conduct outside the collective bargaining agreement sometimes are pre-
empted, and sometimes are not.
147 See McCormick, 934 F2d at 546 n 4 (Phillips dissenting) (noting that IIED claims
are sometimes preempted, and sometimes not); Beatrice Foods, 921 F2d at 1021 (noting
that circuits have reached "varying results" on the question of whether to preempt IIED
claims).
Courts preempting such claims include McCormick, 934 F2d at 537; Romero v Hilton
Hotels, 137 Labor Rel Ref Man (BNA) at 2650; Singh, 6 IER Cases (BNA) at 1686; Beatrice
Foods, 921 F2d at 1021-22; Cook, 911 F2d at 239-40; Douglas v American Information
Technologies Corp., 877 F2d 565, 572-73 (7th Cir 1989); Newberry, 854 F2d at 1149-50;
Hyles, 849 F2d at 1216-17; Willis v Reynolds Metals Co., 840 F2d 254, 255 (4th Cir 1988);
DeTomaso v Pan American World Airways, 733 P2d 614, 620-21 (Cal 1987); Truex v Gar-
nett Freightlines, Inc., 784 F2d at 1347, 1350-51 (9th Cir 1985). See also McCormick, 934
F2d at 536 (preempting IIED claim for actions taken by employer after terminating
employee).
Courts not preempting them include Perugini, 935 F2d at 1089 (no preemption of claim
based on discriminatory remarks because agreement set no standards to determine outra-
geous conduct in that regard); Hanks, 906 F2d at 345 (no preemption of outrageous conduct
and IIED claims because collective agreement provided no remedy); Sauls v Union Oil Co.
of California, 750 F Supp 783, 786-87 (E D Tex 1990) (agreement provided no remedy for
defendant's dealings with non-union management employees); Meier, 748 F Supp at 300 (E
D Pa 1990) (no preemption of IED claim because grievance procedure under the union
contract could not redress such wrongs); Hanks, 859 F2d at 69-70; Tellez, 817 F2d at 539
(no preemption of IIED claim because the collective agreement was vague on disciplinary
procedures and gave no guidance regarding the plaintiff's claim); Zaks v American Broad-
casting Companies, Inc., 626 F Supp 695, 698 (C D Cal 1985) (no preemption because the
emotional distress was linked to clearly unpreempted claims).
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3. whistleblower claims, in which the employer fires an
employee in retaliation for reporting the employer's violation
of a state or federal law, and the employee sues for wrongful
discharge. 148
The IIED cases are particularly hard to distinguish from each
other.149 One dimension upon which many of the IED decisions
can be distinguished is the degree of outrageousness of the alleged
harassment. Some courts preempt when they find that the conduct
alleged is not very outrageous.1 50 On the other hand, some courts
refuse to preempt when the conduct alleged is extremely
outrageous.' 5'
' See notes 162-64 and accompanying text. Courts that have preempted whistleblower
claims include Masters v Daniel Int'l Corp., 917 F2d 455, 457 (10th Cir 1990) (employee
fired for reporting safety violations at nuclear power plant); Vincent v Trend Western
Technical Corp., 828 F2d 563, 566 (9th Cir 1987) (employee fired for reporting employer's
violation of terms of government contract); DeSoto v Yellow Freight Systems, 811 F2d 1333,
1336 (9th Cir 1987) (employee fired for refusing to drive trailer whose registration and vehi-
cle tag had expired); Snow v Bechtel Construction, 647 F Supp 1514, 1520 (C D Cal 1986)
(employee fired for reporting safety violations to Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
Courts that have not preempted them include Dougherty v Parsec, 872 F2d at 771 (em-
ployee fired for filing complaint under Occupational Safety and Health Act); Miller v
Fairchild Industries, 668 F Supp 461, 467 (D Md 1987) (employee fired for reporting viola-
tions of state environmental law); Brevik v Kite Painting, Inc., 416 NW2d 714, 718 (Minn
1987) (employee fired for filing complaint under state occupational safety and health act);
Garibaldi v Lucky Food Stores, 726 F2d 1367, 1375-76 (9th Cir 1984) (employee fired for
reporting violation of state health law).
"I For example, in Truex, 784 F2d at 1344, plaintiffs claimed that their supervisors had
harassed them with warning letters, and then had suspended one of them. The Ninth Cir-
cuit preempted their IIED claims because they involved administration of discipline, which
was a matter covered by the collective agreement. Id at 1350. In response to the plaintiffs'
argument that under the collective agreement, warning letters were not grievable, the court
held that plaintiffs were bound by contractual provisions as to when grievances may be
raised as well as by contractual limitations on the available remedies. Id at 1353.
In contrast, in Sauls v Union Oil Co. of California, 750 F Supp 783 (E D Tex 1990) a
worker claimed he had been harassed by his supervisor and co-workers and then fired. He
filed a grievance, prevailed at arbitration, was reinstated, and then sued for IIED. The
Texas District Court refused to preempt because the record indicated that the plaintiff had
been subjected to a great deal of malicious and outrageous conduct, and that such conduct
was not addressed in the collective bargaining agreement. Id at 788.
50 In Truex, for example, the district court specifically noted that the allegations were
not outrageous enough to withstand preemption. 784 F2d at 1352. See also Romero, 137
Labor Rel Ref Man (BNA) at 2649 (defendants' conduct was not sufficiently outrageous to
save plaintiffs' claim from preemption).
I"' In Zaks, 626 F Supp at 698, for example, the California district court declared that
"[t]he tortious conduct alleged here is so outrageous that no national labor policy would be
served by preempting these claims; no federal interest would be harmed by enforcement of
the state-created rights here." See also Fox, 914 F2d at 802 ("claims premised upon abusive
behavior above and beyond the routine exercise of [collective bargaining] rights are not pre-
empted"); Perugini, 935 F2d at 1089 (harassment claim not preempted where collective bar-
gaining agreement did not establish standard for outrageous conduct).
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It is unclear why the degree of outrageousness should be a fac-
tor in § 301 preemption analysis. Some courts, when using a de-
gree-of-outrageousness factor to determine whether to preempt,
cite Farmer v United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners'52 as
authority for that distinction. 153 In Farmer, the Supreme Court
held that the NLRA did not preempt a claim for extremely outra-
geous tortious conduct, because policing such conduct was so vital
to local concerns that the state's interest overrode the federal in-
terest in uniform application of the labor laws. 54 However, Farmer
preemption was under the NLRA, not under § 301 of the Labor
Relations Management Act. The Supreme Court has not ruled on
whether Farmer applies to § 301 preemption. The Tenth Circuit,
however, has refused to rely on Farmer in a § 301 preemption case,
ruling that "Allis-Chalmers and Lingle, not Farmer control § 301
preemption.' ' 55 Thus Farmer's relevance to § 301 preemption re-
mains unclear.
Recently, the Seventh Circuit developed an approach to § 301
preemption of IIED claims which, if adopted by other circuits,
could lead to preemption of most IIED claims in the future. In
Douglas v American Information Technologies Corp., an employee
had been injured on her job.' When she returned to work, she
refused to work overtime or to accept certain high-stress job as-
signments. She claimed that, as a result of these refusals, the com-
pany engaged in a series of acts with the intent of inflicting emo-
tional distress upon her, including denying her "stress relief days,"
giving her a final warning, and excessively scrutinizing her work. 57
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by enumerating the
three elements necessary to establish the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2)
that the perpetrator intends to cause severe emotional distress;
and (3) that the perpetrator does in fact cause severe emotional
distress.5 1 It then said that to decide whether the conduct alleged
is extreme and outrageous involves determining whether it was au-
152 430 US 290 (1977).
" Cases that cite Farmer include Truex, 784 F2d at 1350-51; Romero, 137 Labor Rel
Ref Man (BNA) at 2649.
"51 430 US at 302-04. Specifically, Farmer allowed a limited exception to NLRA pre-
emption for IIED claims where the conduct complained of is "so outrageous that 'no reason-
able man ... should be expected to endure it,'" and where the claim does not allege dis-
criminatory hiring hall practices. Id at 302-03 & n 11 (citation omitted).
155 Beatrice Foods, 921 F2d at 1021.
,56 877 F2d 565 (7th Cir 1989).
157 Id at 567-68.
158 Id at 570.
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thorized by an express or implied term in the collective bargaining
agreement 59 :
Because [the plaintiff's claim] consists of allegedly wrongful
acts directly related to the terms and conditions of her em-
ployment, resolution of her claim will be substantially depen-
dent on an analysis of the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement under which she is employed. A court will be re-
quired to determine whether her employer's conduct was au-
thorized by the explicit or implicit terms of the agreement. 160
Thus the Seventh Circuit found the claim preempted.
This analysis suggests that any IIED claim that alleges wrong-
ful acts relating to the terms and conditions of employment should
be preempted under § 301 on the grounds that the court could not
assess the outrageousness of the conduct without determining
whether the express or implied terms of the collective agreement
authorize the conduct. This approach obviously would expand the
number of IIED claims that are preempted. 6 '
"Whistleblower cases" are another area where the decisions
are mixed. These are cases in which an employer fires an employee
in retaliation for reporting the employer's violation of a state or
federal law, and the employee sues for wrongful discharge.
Whistleblower cases differ from other wrongful discharge cases in
that the employee bases her argument on a definite, independent
public policy embodied in the law alleged to have been violated.
Some of the whistleblower cases can be distinguished on the
basis of whether the violation reported is of a state or federal law.
Most of the preempted claims allege retaliation for reporting a vio-
lation of a federal law. In those cases, the courts frequently pre-
empt the claims on the basis of both § 301 and the federal statute
involved, under what might be called a "§ 301-plus" preemption
analysis.'62
On the other hand, most of the whistleblower cases that allege
retaliation for reporting violations of state law have not been pre-
"19 Id at 571-72.
"0 Id at 573.
"6' For a critique of the Douglas opinion, see Note, 99 Yale L J at 222 n 77 (cited in
note 116).
2"2 See, for example, Snow, 647 F Supp at 1517-20 (preemption based both on § 301
and the Atomic Energy Act); Olguin v Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F2d 1468, 1475
(9th Cir 1984) (preemption based in part on federal statute governing mine safety).
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empted.6 1 These state-law whistleblower cases can be seen as ap-
plications of Lingle. Recall that the Supreme Court in Lingle re-
fused to preempt a claim that an employee had been discharged
for asserting rights under a state workers' compensation law. So
too, the state whistleblower cases involve alleged retaliation for as-
serting rights under other state laws.164
C. The Future of the Section 301 Preemption Doctrine
As we have seen, in most of the areas in which states have
been expanding the rights of individual employees, unionized em-
ployees who have tried to assert such rights have found their
claims preempted. The only consistent exceptions are for claims
that follow the fact patterns of particular Supreme Court deci-
sions, or for issues for which the grievance procedure is not
available.
In the past two years, some courts have recognized that the
scope of § 301 preemption is expanding to new frontiers.6 5 For ex-
ample, in Jones v General Motors Corp., a plaintiff sued for
breach of an agreement between his union and his employer to set-
tle a former grievance. 66 The Sixth Circuit found the claim pre-
empted, even though the claim implicated no term of the collective
bargaining agreement. The court reasoned that resolution of the
claim would not entail the interpretation of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, but rather, would "require a court to address rela-
tionships that have been created through the collective bargaining
183 See, for example, Fairchild Industries, 668 F Supp at 467 (no preemption of claim
that employee was fired for reporting violations of state environmental law); Brevik, 416
NW2d at 718 (no preemption of claim that employee was fired for filing complaint under
state occupational safety and health act); Garibaldi, 726 F2d at 1375-76 (no preemption of
claim that employee was fired for reporting violation of state health law).
184 In Gonzalez v Prestress Engineering Corp., 115 Ill 2d 1, 503 NE2d 308 (1986), a
pre-Lingle workers' compensation retaliation case, the Illinois Supreme Court suggested an-
other reason why state-law whistleblower cases should not be preempted. The Court refused
to preempt because to do otherwise would mean that the existence of the tort claim de-
pended upon the interpretation of the "just cause" provision in the labor agreement. If this
were the case, "the public policy of this State would become a mere bargaining chip, capable
of being waived or altered by the private parties to a collective bargain." Id at 312. See also
Schwartz and Parrot, 7 St Louis U Pub L Rev at 308-09 (cited in note 104) (applying same
reasoning to state whistleblower cases in general).
185 See generally Committee on Labor Arbitration and the Law of Collective Bargaining
Agreements, Labor Arbitration and the Law of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 7 Labor
Law 747, 755-61 (1991) (noting trend toward more § 301 preemption in 1990).
166 939 F2d 380 (6th Cir 1991).
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process .. . ... The court candidly admitted that this reasoning
was an extension of the Allis Chalmers and Lingle tests, but said:
We have not applied a cramped and narrow construction of
the dictates of Lingle and Allis-Chalmers in reaching our de-
cisions, nor have we limited § 301 preemption to cases where
the precise meaning of precise words in the [collective bar-
gaining agreement] is the crux of the state-based claim.
Rather, we have found many state-based claims pre-empted
because they have implicated the federal policies underlying
federal labor law.1 6s
The court then enumerated four types of claims it had preempted
which did not require the interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement: (1) when "employment relationships which are subject
to a collective bargaining agreement" are implicated; (2) when "the
rights to be vindicated and the relationship between the parties are
created noi by state law, but by the collective agreement itself";
(3) "when a state-based claim requires examining the practices and
customs of a workplace whose conditions are governed by a [collec-
tive bargaining agreement]"; and (4) when employees covered by a
collective bargaining agreement "rely upon the existence of a sepa-
rate, individual employment contract giving rise to state law
claims."169
In a similar vein, in Schlacter-Jones v General Telephone of
California, the Ninth Circuit recently preempted a claim of unlaw-
ful drug testing.' 70 The court reasoned that drug testing was a
working condition, and the working conditions of the plaintiff's
employment were generally governed by a collective bargaining
agreement.1 7' In fact, the court said it would have preempted the
claim "whether or not [drug testing] is specifically discussed in the
[collective bargaining agreement]." 72
Furthermore, in Schlacter-Jones, the Ninth Circuit proposed
a principle of § 301 preemption that would extend it beyond what
any court has yet done. In dicta, the court stated that, in a union-
167 Id at 382. See also DeSherlia v Alpha Beta Co., 1988 US App LEXIS 9378 (9th Cir)
(unpublished disposition) (preempting an employee's claim that her employer breached a
settlement agreement).
'6' Jones, 939 F2d at 383.
Id (citations omitted).
170 936 F2d 435, 439 (9th Cir 1991).
171 Id at 440.
172 Id (quoting Laws, 852 F2d at 433). The court also said, in a footnote, that "it is
immaterial ... that no provision of the CBA explicitly deals with drug testing or gives [the
company] the right to adopt drug and alcohol policies." Id at 439 n 2.
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ized workplace, claims about any working conditions that were
within the scope of collective bargaining would be preempted. 17 3
This suggestion, if accepted, would effectively seal off all unionized
workplaces from state employment regulation.
In the past year, two federal judges have written powerful dis-
senting opinions which criticized these trends in § 301 preemption.
In McCormick v AT&T Technologies,'17 4 Judge Phillips of the
Fourth Circuit undertook a careful and detailed discussion of the
relevant Supreme Court decisions and concluded that the cases
consistently held that § 301 only preempts "state-law claims [that]
formally alleg[e] violations of labor contracts [or] state-law claims
that can be determined to be claims for violation of laborcontracts
[sic] in substance though not in form .. . . 175Accordingly, Judge
Phillips argued that the Supreme Court consistently has insisted
that preemption analysis focus on the "nature of the claim ad-
vanced rather than any defense put forward," and that the em-
ployers' "defensive positions are irrelevant.' 7 6 Judge Phillips con-
cluded that many federal courts had "gotten off the track,' ' 7 7 and
accused those courts of adopting a mistakenly expansive approach
to § 301 preemption, one that was rewriting the act of Congress. 17 8
Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit also has delivered a
dissenting opinion that challenges the broad § 301 preemption doc-
trine. In Livadas v Aubry,179 Judge Kozinski not only critized the
origin of the expansive approach, but also decried its ultimate con-
sequences. In that case, a state labor commissioner declined to
prosecute the plaintiff's claim against her employer for three days
' Schlacter-Jones, 936 F2d at 441. See also Douglas, 877 F2d at 573 (preempting
lIED claim because the alleged harassment related to the terms and conditions of
employment).
174 934 F2d 531 (4th Cir 1991).
171 Id at 543. Judge Phillips further noted:
Where,.though advanced as a tort or otherwise "independent claim," it has been appar-
ent that the duty allegedly violated could only have been created by the labor contract,
preemption has- resulted, Lueck (employer's contractual duty to process insurance
claims); Hechler (union's contractual duty to provide safe workplace); Rawson (union's
contractual duty to make safety inspections); where the duty allegedly violated has
plausibly been located "independently" of any labor contract, in general tort law or
elsewhere, preemption has not resulted, Caterpillar (employer's duty under individual
employee contracts); Lingle (employer's general statutory duty not to discharge
retaliatorily).
Id (emphasis in original).
Id at 543-44.
Id at 544.
178 Id at 547-48.
.7. 943 F2d 1140 (9th Cir 1991).
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pay, on the grounds that she was covered by a collective bargaining
agreement. The commissioner had done so out of an honest but
mistaken belief that the plaintiff's claim was preempted under
§ 301. The plaintiff sued in federal district court under 42 USC
§ 1983, alleging that the commissioner had interfered with her
right under the NLRA to bargain collectively. The district court
granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, and the commissioner
appealed.""0
The Court of Appeals reversed, noting that to hold otherwise
"would require us to hold that she is entitled under the NLRA to a
correct interpretation of California law regarding enforcement of
[state employment law] claims."'' It then added:
Given the primacy of the federal scheme for handling labor
disputes, we believe that Congress would not want state offi-
cials erring on the side of adjudicating state law disputes
whenever it is a close call as to whether a claim is
preempted."8 2
Judge Kozinski wrote a powerful dissent, in which he decried
what he called "a novel doctrine of quasi-preemption.' 83 He ac-
cused his colleagues of "divining some preemptive corona sur-
rounding the federal labor laws."'" 4 He argued that this approach
was contrary to Supreme Court precedent as well as inconsistent
with a proper judicial role. In a footnote, Judge Kozinski further
argued that the quasi-preemption approach was potentially detri-
mental to collective bargaining:
It is not inconceivable that an employer could point to this
discrepancy [between rights for unionized workers and rights
for unorganized workers] as an argument against an effort to
unionize: "Look here, if you vote for the union, the first thing
that happens is that the state Labor Commissioner abandons
you." In a closely fought election, this type of argument might
make a difference. 85
In sum, § 301 preemption is very broad and, notwithstanding
the protests of Judges Phillips and Kozinski, threatens to become
even broader in the future. As a result of this expansive approach
180 Id at 1141-42.
181 Id at 1146.
182 Id at 1147.
18. Id at 1148 (Kozinski dissenting).
184 Id at 1149.
185 Id at 1150 n 2.
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to § 301 preemption, unionized workers have not gotten the bene-
fit of the explosion of individual employee rights in the past
decade.18
IV. EXPLAINING THE SECTION 301 PREEMPTION DOCTRINE: THE
INDUSTRIAL PLURALIST CONCEPTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Why have the courts adopted such a broad § 301 preemption
doctrine? The explanation cannot lie in general principles of fed-
eral preemption of state law. For, as I demonstrate in Section
IV.A. below, § 301 preemption is much broader than preemption in
other areas of federal law. Hence we must look for an explanation
unique to labor law. Toward this end, in Section IV.B., I argue that
the broad § 301 preemption doctrine is attributable to the indus-
trial pluralist approach to collective bargaining that has
predominated in the post-war era. Put simply, industrial pluralism
conceives of labor relations as industrial self-government, in which
management and labor act like political parties in a representative
democracy. By this view, the workplace is an autonomous realm,
resistant to the intrusion of externally-defined rights and obliga-
tions. It is this vision of labor relations that motivates the broad
§ 301 preemption doctrine.
Finally, in Section IV.C., I consider whether § 301 preemption
is simply part of a larger modern trend toward private arbitration
to resolve all kinds of disputes, labor and otherwise. I conclude
that labor arbitration is different from other kinds of arbitration,
for it extinguishes the statutory right in question. By contrast,
other kinds of arbitration enforce statutory rights. In short, § 301
preemption is a unique phenomenon, which can only be explained
by the industrial pluralist metaphor -of labor relations.
A. The Unusual Breadth of Section 301 Preemption
In many other areas, the federal courts have cut back on the
scope of federal preemption. Two recent Supreme Court cases in
particular express a deliberate intention to curtail federal preemp-
tion. In 1985, in Hillsborough County v Automated Medical Labo-
ratories, the Court stated that, when states regulate health and
safety, there is a presumption against federal preemption.1 87 And
I" Note, 99 Yale L J at 229 (cited in note 116); Herman, 9 Indus Rel L J at 638-39
(cited in note 128) (arguing that unionized workers should have the same state employment
rights as do nonunion workers).
187 471 US 707, 715 (1985).
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in 1991, in Gregory v Ashcroft, the Court articulated a "clear state-
ment" rule of preemption, which says that state regulation is only
preempted when the federal legislation clearly states it was in-
tended to have preemptive effect.188 Both of these cases indicate a
trend away from federal preemption of state legislation. Even in
areas of labor law preemption other than § 301, the trend has been
toward less preemption.189
In contrast to this trend, the courts in § 301 cases routinely
find state claims to be preempted even when there is only the
slightest shred of a federal issue involved. If ever there were a stat-
ute that lacked a clear statement of intent to preempt related state
regulation, it is § 301. With its bare fifty words, § 301 has no osten-
sive content whatsoever.190 Indeed, soon after its enactment, many
scholars, as well as a majority of the Supreme Court, opined that
the provision was unconstitutional because it created federal juris-
diction without providing any substantive law which could be the
basis of a federal question.'91 In order to save the constitutionality
of the statute, Justice Douglas in Textile Workers v Lincoln Mills
held that it authorized federal courts to develop a federal common
law of collective bargaining to provide the substance.'92 In other
words, any federal issue that exists in an employee's state law em-
ployment claim comes not from an explicit congressional com-
mand, but rather from a vague and elusive federal common law
that originated as a controversial judicial gloss on § 301.193
Moreover, the courts adopted a broad interpretation of § 301
preemption in the face of several narrower alternatives which were
available within existing legal doctrines. For example, courts could
have stayed with the well-pleaded complaint rule, and confined the
preemption inquiry to the substance of the plaintiff's allegations.
Such an approach would have permitted plaintiffs to vindicate
388 111 S Ct 2395, 2400 (1991) (applying clear statement rule to find no preemption of
state law by Age Discrimination in Employment Act). See also Will v Michigan Department
of State Police, 491 US 58, 65 (1989) ("Congress should make its intention 'clear and mani-
fest' if it intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the states.") (quoting Rice v Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 US 218, 230 (1947)).
' Kosanovich, 4 Labor Law at 250-56 (cited in note 128). But see Eileen Silverstein,
Against Preemption in Labor Law, 24 Conn L Rev 1, 33-52 (1991) (criticizing courts' unusu-
ally broad standard of preemption under the NLRA).
'go See note 70.
'' See, for example, Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v Westinghouse Elec-
tric Corp., 348 US 437, 447-51 (1955) (questioning whether § 301 was constitutional).
192 353 US 448, 450-51 (1957).
See id at 460-61 (Frankfurter dissenting) (accusing the Court of avoiding the "diffi-
cult problems raised by § 301 . . . by attributing to the section an occult content").
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state law rights by choosing not to sue on their collective bargain-
ing agreements. Instead, as we have seen, most courts permit the
defendant to federalize a case by invoking the collective bargaining
agreement in defense, notwithstanding Caterpillar.
Alternatively, courts could have ruled that when a claim is
based upon state law, the fact that the claim requires some inter-
pretation of a collective bargaining agreement does not deprive the
state court of jurisdiction, or render it a § 301 claim. The Supreme
Court took a parallel approach in NLRB v C & C Plywood Corp.,
holding that the NLRB had jurisdiction to interpret a collective
bargaining agreement when necessary to ruling on an unfair labor
practice charge.'" The Court could similarily have held that, when
the graveman of an action involves a state law issue, the state
court has jurisdiction to decide ancillary issues, even if the court
must interpret a collective bargaining agreement. 195
Either of these approaches would have made state law em-
ployment rights cumulative with collectively bargained rights, and
would have permitted unionized employees to enjoy the state law
employment rights available to nonunion employees. Instead of
adopting either of these approaches, however, the courts have
adopted a predisposition, if not a presumption, to preempt.
B. Industrial Pluralism
In order to understand why the courts have chosen to adopt
such a broad § 301 preemption doctrine, it is necessary to see how
the issue of preemption is linked with the industrial pluralist con-
ception of collective bargaining. Industrial pluralism is a set of be-
liefs, doctrines, and institutions that together have dominated the
interpretation of the NLRA in the post-war period.'96
Industrial pluralism is based on a simple metaphor: that col-
lective bargaining is industrial self-government. Management and
labor are like political parties in a representative democracy-each
represents its own constituency and, as in a legislature, engages in
debate and compromise. Thus, management and labor together de-
termine wages and working conditions through a legislative-type
process. These rules are embodied in the collective bargaining
agreement, which the industrial pluralist metaphor calls a statute
or a constitution.
194 385 US 421, 428 (1967).
," The dissent in McCormick, 914 F2d at 538-39, urges this approach.
196 See Stone, 90 Yale L J 1509 (cited in note 4); Stone, 44 Md L Rev 978 (cited in note
5), where I have developed this theme in more detail.
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Industrial pluralism is a descriptive and prescriptive vision of
the workplace as a microcosmic constitutional democracy, a mini-
democracy in the private sphere. One central aspect of the indus-
trial pluralist metaphor is that the workplace, as a mini-democ-
racy, has a separation of powers, and checks and balances, akin to
those found in the greater political democracy. Thus, in addition to
the workplace legislature-collective bargaining negotiations-and
the workplace executive-management-there is a workplace judi-
ciary-private arbitration. The role of private arbitration is to de-
cide disputes concerning application and interpretation of the col-
lective bargaining agreement. And, like the independent judiciary
in our political system, private arbitration is supposed to provide a
neutral vantage point for enforcing the rules, divorced from the
power contests that went into the making of the rules in the first
place. With this separation of powers, industrial pluralism portrays
the workplace as a democratic institution, rather than the enclave
of private power that many social critics have claimed it to be. 197
The industrial pluralist vision is not merely a neutral descrip-
tion of the workplace. It is a description with a normative message
about how collective bargaining should be structured. The picture
of the workplace as an autonomous, self-sufficient, democratic
realm suggests that conditions inside the workplace are fair and
just. The normative message is that all is well, and that outsiders,
such as legislatures, should not intervene. In addition, the picture
suggests that for the autonomous mini-democracy to function it
must replicate the political democracy. Thus private arbitration,
rather than the outside judiciary, should be the exclusive tribunal
for resolving disputes. These two programmatic consequences of
the industrial pluralist conception have had a profound impact on
'17 In the 1950s and 1960s, some democratic theorists were concerned that American
society was not truly democratic because, despite the existence of democratic political insti-
tutions, most people experienced authoritarian control over one of the most important as-
pects of their lives-their workplace. See, for example, Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lind-
blom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare: Planning and Politico-Economic Systems Resolved
into Basic Social Processes 482-83 (Chicago, 2d ed 1976) (describing the power of business
managers as highly discretionary and antidemocratic); Grant McConnell, Private Power and
American Democracy 251-55 (Knopf, 1966) (noting the power of the corporation and dis-
cussing the problem of its illegitimacy); Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social
Bases of Politics 273 (Johns Hopkins, exp ed 1981) (discussing the lack of "integrative par-
ticipation" by American workers). See also Leon H. Keyserling, Why the Wagner Act?, in
Louis G. Silverberg, ed, The Wagner Act: After Ten Years 13 (BNA, 1945) (the American
institution of collective bargaining, by introducing self-government into industry, preserves
our democratic way of life) (quoting Senator Robert F. Wagner, address at National Demo-
cratic Club Forum, May 8, 1937).
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the development of the law of collective bargaining in the postwar
era.
One result of industrial pluralist rhetoric is that the Supreme
Court has elevated private arbitration to an exalted status within
labor law doctrine. 198 In a series of benchmark decisions in the late
1950s and early 1960s, the Supreme Court adopted the pluralist
rationale of defending the mini-democracy from external, particu-
larly judicial, intervention.' It announced a national labor policy
of promoting private arbitration and adopted a policy of extreme
deference to the arbitral process.200 In fact, it decreed an amount
of judicial deference to labor arbitration which was much greater
than the deference paid to arbitration in any other field.21 Accord-
ingly, the Court erected a structure in which rulings by labor arbi-
trators were placed effectively beyond the reach of judicial
review. 202
The industrial pluralist interpretation of the labor laws thus
had the effect of reprivatizing labor relations. It also established a
rigid barrier between the workplace and external sources of law. As
a result, the collective bargaining system has not been able to ac-
commodate the proliferating individual employment rights of the
1980s.
1. Explaining the broad Section 301 preemption doctrine.
Understanding the industrial pluralist belief in the sanctity of
the mini-democracy can illuminate the predisposition of judges to
" News America Publications v Newark Typographical Union, 918 F2d 21, 24 (3d Cir
1990) (on "exalted status" of arbitration). See also United Paperworkers v Misco, Inc., 484
US 29, 37-38 (1987) (discussing need to "insulat[e] arbitral decisions from judicial review").
"' See Stone, 90 Yale L J at 1526-31 (cited in note 4).
200 Lincoln Mills, 353 US at 456 ( 301 represents a national policy to enforce arbitra-
tion agreements); United Steelworkers of America v American Manufacturing Company,
363 US 564, 567-68 (1960) (courts should enforce agreements to arbitrate regardless of the
merits of the specific grievance); United Steelworkers of America v Warrior & Gulf Naviga-
tion Co., 363 US 574, 585 (1960) (strong presumption of arbitrability); and United Steel-
workers of America v Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 US 593, 597-98 (1960) (Court will
enforce arbitrator's judgment, even if arbitrator's opinion is ambiguous, so long as it "draws
its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.").
20 See notes 73-74, 221 and accompanying text.
02 United Paperworkers, 484 US at 37-38. See also note 73 (on Enterprise Wheel test).
At the same time, the Court constricted the jurisdiction of the NLRB so as to make
arbitration the primary, ow, final, adjudicator of the statutory as well as contractual rights
of organized workers. See ('arey v Westinghouse, 375 US 261, 270-71 (1964) ("If by the time
the dispute reaches the Board, arbitration has already taken place, the Board shows defer-
ence to the arbitral award, provided the procedure was a fair one and the results were not
repugnant to the [NLRA].").
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find state employment rights preempted by § 301. Under the in-
dustrial pluralist view, the terms of the bargain that the parties to
the mini-democracy reach, and the enforcement mechanism that
the parties establish, are superior to any state-imposed employ-
ment terms. Thus it would only do harm to interfere.
To the extent that courts believe the rhetoric of industrial plu-
ralism, they want to keep judicial scrutiny as well as external law
out of the workplace as much as possible. Accordingly, they have
insisted upon insulating collective bargaining from external sources
of employment rights. Section 301 preemption provides them with
a means to do so.203 By expanding the scope of § 301 preemption,
courts keep state employment law out of the unionized workplace.
Thus, the unstated belief in the superiority of the mini-democracy
is the driving force behind the judicial predisposition to
preempt.0 4
203 When a federal law regulates conduct within a unionized workplace, the issue is
deferral, not preemption. In that area, the Supreme Court has permitted more penetration
by external law. Recall that in Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court held that an individual
may bring a Title VII claim of discrimination, even though an arbitration procedure had
heard and decided the same dispute. 415 US at 59-60. See note 139. The Court similarily
has held that an individual may bring claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and under
§ 1983 in federal court, notwithstanding a prior arbitration. Barrantine v Arkansas-Best
Freight System, 450 US 728 (1981) (FLSA); McDonald v City of West Branch, 466 US 284
(1984) (§ 1983). Many management labor lawyers have found these doctrines unduly restric-
tive of their ability to use arbitration in lieu of litigation for employee statutory claims. See,
for example, Jay W. Waks and Louis Ginsberg, Arbitrating Executive and Other Employ-
ment Disputes: Let's Put a Pin in Gardner-Denver! in 43d Annual National Conference on
Labor 245, 303-05 (cited in note 24) (urging that Gardner-Denver be overturned).
In 1991, the Supreme Court decided a case that arguably cuts back on the scope of
deferral to employees' federal statutory claims. Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
111 S Ct 1647 (1991), held that an individual who agreed to arbitrate all disputes concerning
his employment was required to arbitrate his statutory claim under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act. Some labor lawyers and scholars are predicting that, after Gilmer, the
Supreme Court will reverse Gardner-Denver. Stephen A. Mazurak, The Status of the Em-
ployment Relationship: The 1990-91 Supreme Court Term, 7 Labor Law 849, 865-66 (1991);
Robert L. Duston, Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: A Major Step Forward for Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution, or a Meaningless Decision?, 7 Labor Law 823, 834 (1991).
20, See, for example, McCormick, 934 F2d at 538 ("Our holding that McCormick's state
law claims are preempted by § 301 protects the continued vitality of grievance procedures as
a fair and efficient means for the resolution of labor disputes . . . ."); White, 938 F2d at 481
("Driving the Court's decision in [Allis-Chalmers was] the need to preserve the central role
of arbitration established in collective bargaining contracts."). On the close relationship be-
tween § 301 preemption and the grievance and arbitration system, see also Beatrice Foods,
921 F2d at 1020 (Allis-Chalmers consistent with broad policy favoring arbitration that the
Supreme Court stated in The Steelworkers Trilogy). See also Clyde W. Summers, Labor
Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 Nebr L Rev 7, 20 (1988) (decisions
like Allis-Chalmers "cast a cloud" over possibility of unionized workers using state courts to
remedy wrongful dismissals, thereby preserving "central role of arbitration in interpreting
the [labor] contract").
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An example will illustrate this point. In Jackson v Liquid Car-
bonic Corp., an employee had been terminated after he had tested
positive in an employer-instituted drug testing program.20 5 Al-
though he was covered by a collective bargaining agreement, he
elected to sue in state court on the basis of a state privacy statute
and the state constitutional right to privacy. The employer argued
that the claim was preempted, removed to federal court, and
moved to dismiss. 20 6
In analyzing the preemption issue, the court had to interpret
the state law. At the time, the state law was new, so it had not yet
been interpreted by the state courts. The First Circuit interpreted
the state law not as imposing an absolute prohibition on drug test-
ing, but rather as calling for a balancing test-between the em-
ployee's right to privacy and the employer's legitimate interest in
conducting the test.20 7 Thus it said that the statute prohibited
"only unreasonable interferences with a person's privacy."208 The
court concluded that to perform the balance and to decide what
was reasonable required the court to interpret the collective bar-
gaining agreement.209 More specifically, what was reasonable re-
garding drug testing had to be
assessed in light of the practices and exigencies of the indus-
try, factors which are routinely considered when interpreting
a collective bargaining agreement. [Therefore plaintiff's pri-
vacy claim is] inseparable from an interpretation of what is or
is not 'reasonable' under the labor contract .... [It is] both
negotiable and bound up in the interstices of the
Agreement .... .2
The collective bargaining agreement contained a clause that
gave management a right "to post reasonable rules and regulations
20- 863 F2d 111, 112-13 (1st Cir 1988).
'06 Id at 113.
207 Id at 115-16.
208 Id at 116 (quoting Bratt v International Business Machines Corp., 392 Mass 508,
467 NE2d 126, 135 (1984)).
209 Significantly, the court admitted that the state courts had not yet addressed the
issue of employee drug testing. But it surmised that the state courts "would view the collec-
tive bargaining process as an appropriate datum in constructing the needed balance between
the worker's privacy rights and the legitimate concerns of management." Id at 117. "A right
subject to a balance involving the needs and interests of the parties is, almost of necessity,
defined by the parties themselves." Id.
210 Id at 119. Later the court reiterated that, in determining reasonableness under the
state privacy statute, it did "not see how, under state law, the Agreement can be omitted
from the equation." Id at 121.
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from time to time."211 This, the court said, established a sufficient
nexus between the drug testing and the collective agreement to
preempt the employee's claim.212 Embellishing upon this reason-
ing, the First Circuit went on to note the central role of arbitration
in the system of industrial self-government, and ultimately con-
cluded that to permit this plaintiff to sue on a state law claim
"would surely undermine the structure of industrial self-
government. '213
There are three problems with the First Circuit's analysis.
First, the court found that the state right required balancing. How-
ever, the state right might not have required balancing at all-it
might have been an absolute prohibition of employer drug testing.
In that event, there would be no room for the collective bargaining
agreement to limit, define, or waive the state law right. The court
could have certified this question to the state court rather than
interpreting the state law in the first instance.1 4
Second, the court did not give a convincing account as to why
the employer's right to make reasonable rules had any bearing on
the plaintiff's privacy claim. The dissent argued that the manage-
ment rights clause in the collective agreement was far too general
and vague to support preemption of this particular claim, 15 evi-
dently interpreting the clause giving management the right to
make "reasonable rules and regulations" as boilerplate. In the face
of explicit rules imposed from without, the dissent said, the em-
ployer-made rules should yield. The dissent concluded that, even if
the state statute required balancing, the balancing inquiry was not
necessarily bound up with the collective agreement." '1
The third and most significant problem with the First Cir-
cuit's reasoning was that it did not explain why the contractual
provision giving the employer the right to make "reasonable rules
and regulations from time to time" trumped state law. That is,
even if the state law did call for balancing, the court assumed that,
in the balance, the employer's rules outweighed the legislature's
rules. In essence, the court was saying that the rules made within
211 Id at 113.
212 Id at 119.
213 Id at 121-22.
214 See Note, 40 Syracuse L Rev at 1296 (cited in note 119) (suggesting that the Jack-
son court should have taken this approach).
215 863 F2d at 122 (Bownes dissenting) ("In the instant case, there [was] nothing in the
collective-bargaining agreement which even remotely deal[t] with the subject of drug testing
or privacy rights.").
"' Id at 124.
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the mini-democracy were superior to those of external law. Pre-
sumably the court believed that because parties had bargained to
give management the right to make reasonable rules, the rules im-
posed by the state legislature should yield. The court could have
assumed, to the contrary, that the employer's contractual right to
make rules must be exercised consistently with state law.
In short, the relationship between the bargained-for right of
management to make "reasonable rules" and the specific require-
ments of state law depends upon assumptions about the superior-
ity vel non of the mini-democracy. The Jackson case exemplifies a
favorable view of the industrial pluralist mini-democracy. In that
view, the rules of the autonomous world of the unionized work-
place are superior to external law. If those rules vest management
with discretion in a particular area, then management is free to
exercise that discretion, despite restrictions imposed by a state
legislature.
Even in the absence of an explicit contractual provision giving
management the right to make "reasonable rules," many courts
have said that such a provision might be implied.211 It is increas-
ingly common for courts to recognize the possibility that a collec-
tive agreement contains implied terms, particularly terms that
grant discretion to management.21 Such an implied term, under
the Jackson court's reasoning, would preempt a state law right,
even in the absence of any contractual language on the subject.
The industrial pluralist assumption about the superiority of
the mini-democracy explains not only the courts' expansive ap-
proach to § 301 preemption, but also the exceptions to § 301 pre-
emption that were described above. As we saw, courts find that
most claims by unionized workers invoking state employment
rights are preempted. There are exceptions for the cases presenting
the precise fact patterns which the Supreme Court has already ad-
dressed, and for claims not cognizable under the grievance proce-
dure. The industrial pluralist assumption that the mini-democracy
is superior to external law explains this latter exception. When a
plaintiff cannot bring a claim within the internal judiciary of the
workplace, there is no reason to preempt.
21 See, for example, Douglas, 877 F2d at 572-73.
218 See, for example, Consolidated Rail Corp. v Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S
Ct 2477, 2485 (1989) ("Conrail"). See also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor Relations on
the Airlines; the Railway Labor Act in the Era of Deregulation, 42 Stan L Rev 1485, 1513-
22 (1990); Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 Harv L Rev
999, 1010-16 (1955).
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2. Limitations of the mini-democracy.
The industrial pluralist conception of collective bargaining
forces workers to choose between contractual rights which they can
obtain in a union setting, or statutory rights, which they can obtain
in a nonunion setting. Because workers often can achieve superior
substantive rights in the collective bargaining context than they
have under external law, one could argue that the loss of statutory
rights is more than compensated by the gain in contractual rights.
This argument would be true if unions in fact achieve superior
rights in collective bargaining, and if unions can effectively enforce
those rights in the grievance and arbitration system. The latter
precondition is problematic.
Despite its rhetoric of providing workplace democracy, the ar-
bitration system has not provided a satisfactory means for workers
to enforce collectively bargained employment rights. 19 Arbitration
is ineffective partly because it does not provide the due process
protections available in a public tribunal, be it a court or an ad-
ministrative agency. As Justice Brennan has said,
Arbitral factfinding is not generally equivalent to judicial
factfinding .... "[T]he record of the arbitration proceedings is
not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and
rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as discov-
ery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony
under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable. '"220
In addition, there is no effective right of appeal.22'
Furthermore, remedies in arbitration are not as effective or as
generous as remedies in a judicial forum. For example, most arbi-
trators believe that they do not have the power to award damages
for intangible harms, or to award punitive or consequential dam-
219 See Stone, 90 Yale L J at 1529-30 (cited in note 4); Atleson, 11 NYU Rev L & Soc
Change at 95 (cited in note 44).
220 McDonald v West Branch, 466 US 284, 291 (1984) (quoting Gardner-Denver, 415
US at 57-58).
221 The Supreme Court has propounded an extremely narrow standard of review for
labor arbitration. In Enterprise Wheel, the Court said that an arbitral award should be
overturned only if it failed to derive its essence from the agreement. 363 US at 597. It also
said that mere ambiguity about the essential foundation of the award would not be grounds
for overturning the award. Id at 598. The "essence test" combined with the "presumption of
arbitral regularity" have rendered judicial review of arbitrator rulings practically unobtain-
able. See Peter Feuille and Michael LeRoy, Grievance Arbitration Appeals in the Federal
Courts: Facts and Figures, 45 Arb J 35, 40-45 (Mar 1990) (since the Steelworkers Trilogy in
1960, less than 1% of all arbitral awards have been challenged in court, and of those chal-
lenged, almost three-quarters have been upheld).
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ages. 222 In addition, arbitrators almost never grant interest on back
pay awards, even when they are issued months or years after an
unjust dismissal.1 3 It is common practice for an arbitrator to
award reinstatement but no back pay at all to a worker fired with-
out just cause. 24 In contrast, prevailing parties in unjust dismissal
litigation receive jury awards in the mid to high six figures.2 5 Fur-
thermore, most arbitrators believe that they do not have the power
to order provisional relief. 226 Thus many contract violations, such
as improper job assignments or safety matters, can neither be pre-
vented nor remedied after the fact. In addition, arbitrators do not
provide the accountability of a public forum. They are not bound
by precedent, their awards are rarely published, the hearings are
not held in open court, and arbitrators are not public officials ac-
countable to public pressures and sworn to uphold public
policies.227
Thus the legacy of industrial pluralism has been to weaken the
employment rights of unionized workers within the mini-democ-
racy by not providing adequate means for their enforcement. At
222 Frank Elkouri and Edna Asper Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 401-06 (BNA, 4th
ed 1985); Otis H. King, How Whole is Whole?: Remedies in Labor Arbitration, 3 J Contemp
Legal Issues 167, 169-73 (1989-90) (on reluctance of arbitrators to award consequential dam-
ages); E. Allan Farnsworth, Punitive Damages in Arbitration, 20 Stetson L Rev 395, 400-01
(1991) (speculating about why arbitrators might be reluctant to award punitive damages).
See also Note, Protecting Intangible Expectations Under Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments-Overcoming the Proscription of Arbitral Penalties, 61 Minn L Rev 127, 128 (1976)
(urging arbitrators to use penalties to protect employees' intangible interests in their labor
contracts).
223 See, for example, Intermountain Operators League, 26 Labor Arb (BNA) 149, 154
(1956) (Kadish, Arbitrator) ("[I]t is not customary in arbitrations for the arbitrator to grant
interest on claims which he finds owing.").
22 King, 3 J Contemp Legal Issues at 171 (cited in note 222); Howard Lesnick, Re-
sponse, 11 NYU J L & Soc Change 142, 145 (1982-83).
225 A study of 121 awards in wrongful discharge litigation in California between 1980
and 1986 found that prevailing plaintiffs won, on average, $650,000 in the initial jury award,
of which about 40% was for punitive damages. It also found that the median award was
$177,000. James Dertouzos, Elaine Holland, and Patricia Ebener, The Legal Consequences
of Wrongful Termination vii (Rand Institute for Civil Justice, 1988). This figure may some-
what overstate the comparison because many of the prevailing plaintiffs in the Rand study
were middle-level managerial employees, whose salary, and hence back pay, is higher than
that of most union members. See also Cliff Palefsky, Wrongful Termination Litigation:
"Dagwood" and Goliath, 62 Mich Bar J 776 (1983) (discussing a 1982 study finding that
90% of California discharge cases that went to trial retulted in verdicts for plaintiff, and
that the average award on these verdicts was $450,000).
226 Elkouri and Elkouri, How Arbitration Works at 401-02 (cited in note 222).
"I Stone, 90 Yale L J at 1529-30 (cited in note 4). See also Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 Yale L J 1073, 1085-87 (1984) (criticizing alternative dispute resolution be-
cause its aim is to provide peace rather than justice, thereby sacrificing important public
values).
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the same time, the industrial pluralist ideology has fueled the
trend toward expansive § 301 preemption. It has both hindered
unionized workers' ability to implement their contractual rights
and deprived them of employment rights under external law.
3. The historical development of industrial pluralism.
These limitations of collective bargaining were not apparent
until the 1970s and 1980s, when unorganized workers began to re-
ceive legislative and judicial assistance in the form of the explosion
of individual employee rights. Until then, whatever rights were
available to unionized workers through the bargaining and arbitra-
tion system were the only rights workers had, so there was no stan-
dard by which to measure such rights. But now, the proliferation
of state employment rights, together with the current § 301 pre-
emption doctrine, means that collectively bargained rights are not
always better.
One might ask, how could this system of collective bargaining
have flourished for so long if it is indeed destructive of union
strength? Here some historical perspective is helpful.
Industrial pluralism developed in the postwar years, at a time
when an expanding economy and United States dominance in the
world led to a rising standard of living for most Americans and a
general feeling of optimism about the future. Part of this optimism
included the view that employers would come to accept unionism,
that the scope of bargaining between management and labor would
continually expand, and that unions would come to play greater
and greater roles in corporate decisionmaking. 2 s In an environ-
ment of economic expansion, stable markets and thriving compa-
nies, job security was not a particularly pressing concern. Collec-
tive bargaining about such items as wages, seniority, pensions, and
so forth was sufficient to protect workers' interests. In the first de-
cades after World War II, unions successfully negotiated regular
wage increases, established health and pension benefit programs,
and protected employees against arbitrary treatment.229 For a
workforce that recently had experienced the Great Depression and
the wage freezes of World War II, these were enormous accom-
228 See Kochan, Katz, and McKersie, Transformation of American Industrial Relations
at 45-46 (cited in note 34) (describing optimism of the postwar period).
229 See Neil W. Chamberlain, The Union Challenge to Management Control 74-88
(Harper, 1948) (describing union penetration of traditional managerial areas such as wages,
hours, advancement policies, health and safety, disciplinary control, hiring practices, and
layoffs).
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plishments. Thus industrial pluralism was helpful to unions be-
cause it forced employers to deal with them about issues of impor-
tance to their members.
230
At the same time, the analogy of the workplace to a mini-de-
mocracy gave the labor movement a mantle of respectability in the
public mind-a mantle that it never before had, and since has lost.
This mantle paid off in real terms: In strike situations, the public
was loathe to cross picket lines and the unemployed were loathe to
accept jobs as replacements. Thus the high public esteem of organ-
ized labor played a role in strengthening the labor movement.
Labor's demise in the public mind paralleled the demise of
union strength. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, well-publicized
stories of labor corruption and scandal turned public opinion away
from labor. 23'1 Other social causes like the civil rights movement
and the anti-war movement captured the hearts and minds of the
liberal intelligentsia. At the same time, industrial pluralism's em-
phasis on the mini-democracy led unions to focus their attention
on plant-specific or company-specific gains, and to refrain from de-
veloping strategies or coalitions with other groups to achieve
broader legislative goals.
The decade of the 1980s was a watershed for American work-
ers in several respects. First, in that decade there was a distinctly
sharper rate of membership decline, a decline so pronounced that
some scholars predicted the end of organized labor as a significant
force on the American scene. 232 At the same time, the dramatic
corporate transformations of the decade produced correspondingly
dramatic employee dislocations.2 33 This led to a public climate
which was receptive to, if not insistent upon, some protection for
230 Kochan, Katz, and McKersie, Transformation of American Industrial Relations at
45-46 (cited in note 34) (New Deal System of labor relations worked well until the 1970s).
' For an account of the declining esteem of organized labor amongst the public at
large from the 1940s through the 1960s, see Derek Curtis Bok and John Thomas Dunlop,
Labor and the American Community 15-19 (Simon & Schuster, 1970).
232 See note 8 and accompanying text. Paul Weiler has given data suggesting that, by
the year 2000, unions would represent less than 10% of the American private sector
workforce. Weiler, Governing the Workplace at 10 (cited in note 27). See also Troy, 59 U
Chi L Rev at 683 (cited in note 12) (estimating 7%). But see McDonald, 31 Indus Rel at 15
(cited in note 10) (Assistant to the Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO) (disputing Weiler's
projection and arguing that unions probably would not decline as sharply in 1990s as in
1980s).
"I There is considerable disagreement about whether takeovers and corporate restruc-
turings actually cause net job loss. See Stone, 21 Stetson L Rev at 45 n 4 (cited in note 66)
(summarizing debate). Whether the case can be made or not, however, the AFL-CIO be-
lieves that takeovers cause massive job loss. See note 35 and accompanying text. Large sec-
tors of the American public share that belief.
[59:575
Industrial Pluralism
the job security of individual employees. The legislative and judi-
cial protections that have resulted, while minimal, have begun to
rival the protection offered by unions.
Under a different system of collective bargaining, the new leg-
islation and judicial protections for employees might have been cu-
mulative with collective bargaining.3 4 But under the industrial
pluralist system, there was no place for state-created rights.
C. Industrial Pluralism and the Trend Toward Private
Arbitration
One could argue that expansive § 301 preemption, while unfor-
tunate for labor, derives not from a particular view of collective
bargaining, but rather from a larger trend toward alternative dis-
pute resolution in the legal system generally. For example, one
could argue that the § 301 preemption trends are no different from
recent developments in the areas of securities, antitrust, and age
discrimination, where the Supreme Court has been expanding the
role of private arbitration.
In a series of decisions in the 1980s, the Supreme Court held
that many types of judicially cognizable claims are subject to arbi-
tration under the Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA"). 3 5 In 1983,
in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v Mercury Construction
Corp., the Supreme Court found that a state law claim for breach
of contract was subject to arbitration by virtue of an arbitration
clause in the parties' agreement. 236 In language reminiscent of The
Steelworkers' Trilogy, the Court said that
[t]he Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal
law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitral issues should
be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at
234 For example, in western Europe, the welfare state measures enacted in the postwar
era were compatible with collective bargaining. See, for example, Charles S. Maier, "Ficti-
tious bonds. of wealth and law": on the theory and practice of interest representation,
in Suzanne Berger, ed, Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporation,
and the Transformation of Politics 27, 54-55 (Cambridge, 1981) ("Fictitious Bonds").
231 See, for example, Mitsubishi Motors v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 US 614, 640
(1985) (Sherman Act claims); Shearson/American Express v McMahon, 482 US 220, 238,
242 (1987) (claims under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO); Rodri-
guez de Quijaq v Shearson/American Express, 490 US 477, 480 (1987) (claims under the
Securities Act of 1933); Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S Ct 1647, 1657
(1991) (ADEA claim).
2' 460 US 1, 24-25 (1983).
1992]
The University of Chicago Law Review
hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.237
In 1985, the Supreme Court found claims arising under the
federal antitrust laws to be subject to mandatory arbitration under
the FAA. In Mitsubishi Motors v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, the
Court invoked the presumption of arbitrability and ordered the
parties to arbitrate claims arising under the Sherman Antitrust
Act, even though their arbitration agreement did not explicitly ap-
ply to statutory claims.238 The Court said that, so long as the par-
ties even arguably had agreed to arbitrate the statutory issue, and
so long as Congress had not intentionally removed the statutory
issue from arbitration, the parties were required by the FAA to
submit to arbitration.23 9 Since then, the Supreme Court has or-
dered arbitration of other federal statutory claims, including
claims for securities act violations, civil RICO claims, and age dis-
crimination claims. 40
The rise of arbitration in non-labor areas thus seems to paral-
lel the rise of arbitration in the labor area twenty-five years earlier.
Indeed, in Mitsubishi, the Court drew support from labor law cases
for the presumption of arbitrability it applied to the Federal Arbi-
tration Act.2 41 However, there is a crucial difference between the
new wave of arbitration under the FAA and labor arbitration
under § 301. When the FAA compels arbitration of a statutory is-
sue in a non-labor context, the issue for the arbitrator to decide is
the statutory right in dispute. For example, in Mitsubishi, the is-
sue to be arbitrated was the application of the Sherman Antitrust
Act to the respondent's alleged behavior. The arbitration clause
only functioned to indicate the parties' choice between an arbitral
or judicial forum. As the Supreme Court said in Mitsubishi, "[b]y
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute .... 24 2 In keeping with
the FAA arbitrator's responsibility to enforce the parties' substan-
237 Id.
238 473 US 614, 624-26, 640 (1985).
219 Id at 626-28.
240 McMahon, 482 US at 238 (Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and civil RICO); Rodri-
guez de Quijas, 490 US at 480 (Securities Act of 1933); Gilmer, 111 S Ct at 1657 (ADEA).
"' See Mitsubishi, 473 US at 626, citing Warrior & Gulf, 363 US at 582-83.
22 473 US at 628. See also Volt Information Sciences v Board of Trustees, 109 S Ct
1248, 1255 (1989).
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tive rights under the statute at issue, courts vacate awards when
the arbitrator has shown "manifest disregard of the law. '24 3
In contrast, an arbitration requirement under § 301 does not
involve merely a change in the forum for resolving a statutory dis-
pute. Rather, labor arbitrators are required to decide cases by in-
terpreting the collective bargaining agreement, not by interpreting
external law.244 Thus, despite the superficial similarity between
§ 301 and FAA arbitration, the two types of arbitration are en-
tirely different. Arbitration under the FAA enforces statutory
claims; arbitration under § 301 extinguishes statutory claims. Sec-
tion 301 preemption cannot be understood as part of the general
tendency by the courts to move statutory issues into arbitral tribu-
nals. Rather, it must be understood as part of the unique and un-
easy relationship between the labor law system and external law.
V. EvALUATING THE NEW SYSTEM OF LABOR REGULATION
So far I have shown that the current system of labor relations
in the United States creates a tension between collective bargain-
ing and individual employment rights. As collective labor rights
have declined, and as states have sought to compensate by
strengthening individual employee rights, the broad § 301 preemp-
tion doctrine has placed union workers at a disadvantage relative
to nonunion workers, by denying the former the benefit of the
state law employment rights. I have also shown that § 301 preemp-
tion cannot be explained as part of the general trend of the past
decade to refer statutory claims to arbitration. Rather, I have ar-
gued that the broad § 301 preemption doctrine must be under-
stood as an aspect of the industrial pluralist interpretation of the
labor laws, an interpretation that relies on a sharp distinction be-
tween contractual rights and statutory rights, between collective
bargaining and external law. By so embracing industrial pluralist
forms of collective bargaining, the current system of labor relations
in the United States sets up a dichotomy between collective bar-
gaining and individual employment rights.
U3 See, for example, McMahon, 482 US at 232 (judicial review of FAA arbitration "is
sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute"). See C.
Evan Stewart, Securities Arbitration Appeal: An Oxymoron No Longer?, 79 Ky L J 347,
351-55 (1990-91) (history of the "manifest disregard of the law" standard); Comment, Over-
coming the Presumption of Arbitrability of ADEA Claims: The Triumph of Substantive
over Procedural Values in Nicholson v. CPC International, Inc., 138 U Pa L Rev 1817, 1824
(1990).
24 See note 74 on arbitrators' use of external law.
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We are thus left with several normative questions: First, are
workers better off dispensing with collective bargaining and in-
stead seeking workplace justice under the emerging regime of indi-
vidual rights? Second, can we conceive of alternative legal regimes
in which collective and individual employment rights are compati-
ble and mutually reinforcing? Third, do the developments in Sec-
tion 301 preemption and the legal incompatibility between union-
ism and individual rights play a role in union decline? I will
address each of these questions below.
A. The Minimal Terms/Individual Rights Model of Labor
Relations
The growth of individual employment rights and the reduction
in protection for collective bargaining suggest that the emerging
system of labor regulation is one in which there are legislatively
and judicially imposed minimal terms of employment, without col-
lective bargaining. I call this the individual rights/minimal terms
model of labor relations.
If the emerging system of individual employment rights does
in fact provide universal employment rights, then it is plausible
that most workers would benefit by dispensing with collective bar-
gaining altogether. That is, perhaps individual workers have
regained legislatively what they have lost in collective bargaining,
so that on balance they have not been harmed by the broad § 301
preemption doctrine and the decline of unions.
Professor Charles Fried has been a spokesman for this point of
view. Professor Fried has advocated that we move "toward direct
imposition of specific minimal terms and standards where
problems in the workplace have been perceived [and] away from
governmentally sheltered monopoly status for labor unions."24'
Unemployment insurance, workplace safety regulations, anti-dis-
crimination protection, and protection against unjust dismissal are
laudatory examples of such minimal terms.2 46 He argues that, with-
out collective bargaining, the law could achieve the larger goals of
ensuring free association, a social minimum level of resources, job
security, industrial democracy, dignity on the job, allocative effi-
ciency and industrial peace.247
245 Fried, 51 U Chi L Rev at 1040 (cited in note 4).
248 Id at 1036-37.
2 Id at 1020-21.
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While Professor Fried's approach seems to describe the trends
we have seen in the law, there are several problems with his nor-
mative conclusions: First, providing individual employment rights
without a union does not allow employees to participate in corpo-
rate decisionmaking. To the extent that we value not only minimal
employment standards but also the opportunity for employees to
have a say about workplace issues that concern them, the nonun-
ion rights model is not an adequate substitute. 48
Second, there is some evidence that productivity improves
when employees have an avenue for expressing discontent with
voice rather than exit.249 Some nonunion firms have established in-
ternal grievance mechanisms to gain the benefits of a voice mecha-
nism without incurring the costs and disadvantages of having a
union.25 0 However, some have argued that such mechanisms, when
not truly independent, ultimately breed distrust, cynicism, and low
morale.25'
Third, minimal terms are too uniform and rigid to address the
preferences of employees at all workplaces; they cannot accommo-
date local differences. Therefore they are not a particularily effi-
cient way to improve wages and working conditions. 252 They can
provide basic minima, but above a very low level they cannot pro-
vide meaningful improvements.253
Fourth, minimal terms often are not effective. For example,
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 directed the Labor
Department and the National Institute of Safety and Health to set
standards for all potentially hazardous industrial substances in
use, to apply to all workplaces. 25 4 Such a project is so vast, and the
interests affected so varied, that today, twenty years after the en-
actment of the legislation, standards have only been set for a small
number of the tens of thousands of industrial chemicals in com-
248 Summers, 67 Nebr L Rev at 26 (cited in note 204).
2,' Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? 162-80 (Basic,
1984).
260 Sanford M. Jacoby, Employing Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions, and the Transfor-
mation of Work in American Industry, 1900-45 257 (Columbia, 1985).
211 See Mike Parker and Jane Slaughter, Choosing Sides: Unions and the Team Con-
cept 222-23 (South End, 1988).
... See Steven L. Willborn, Individual Employment Rights and the Standard Eco-
nomic Objection: Theory and Empiricism, 67 Nebr L Rev 101, 109-27 (1988).
213 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics-And the New Admin-
istrative Law, 98 Yale L J 341, 364-66 (1988) ("In more general cases regulation is likely to
reduce employment levels and the real value of take-home pay .... ").
"' Pub L No 91-596, 84 Stat 1590, codified at 29 USC §§ 651 et seq (1988).
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mon use.255 As a result, the effort to establish minimal terms at the
national level has left most workplaces without any terms at all.25
The fifth and final flaw in the individual rights/minimal terms
model is that it is inherently unstable. Any improvements in pro-
tections for individual employees that occur without the presence
of a strong union movement are vulnerable and transitory. This is
because employees who are not in unions are not organized into a
political constituency that can protect the minimal terms in the
future. Without an organized constituency, any minimal terms en-
acted can always be repealed or negated through judicial
interpretation.
Within a democratic polity, if there is no organized constitu-
ency that can articulate and advocate the interests of a segment of
the population, those interests almost certainly will be ignored.
This is true whether the polity is conceived to be a pluralistic com-
petition of interest groups or a republican search for a common
public good. As the labor movement continues to decline, there
may soon be no organized pressure group that is capable of defend-
ing or improving individual employment rights in the future. Thus
the individual rights/minimal terms model of labor relations con-
tains a built-in self-destruct dynamic. It functions to disorganize
labor, to prevent the very group-formation that is necessary, to re-
tain or improve the minimal terms. For that reason, the individual
rights and minimal terms in this model have an inherent tendency
to disappear.2 57
B. Alternative Nonpluralist Forms of Collective Bargaining
If the minimal terms/individual rights model of labor regula-
tion is not a reliable means of providing workplace justice, then we
must ask whether there exist forms of labor regulation based upon
collective rights that do not reinstate the failures of industrial plu-
ralism. Elsewhere I have described two such models-one actual
and one imagined-and I briefly summarize them below. The ac-
tual one is that of the Railway Labor Act, as it existed from 1926
2. See John M. Mendelhoff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation: How Over-
regulation Causes Underregulation at OSHA 74-78 (MIT, 1988).
266 Id at 74-102. See also Cass Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution 82 (Harvard, 1990)
(OSHA ineffective).
2 Professor Richard Epstein has advocated a "no rights" form of labor regulation, in
which workers have neither protection for collective bargaining nor individual employment
rights. He justifies this as furthering economic efficiency. See Richard Epstein, In Defense
of Contract-at-Will, 51 U Chi L Rev 947 (1984); Richard Epstein, A Common Law of Labor
Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 Yale L J 1357 (1983).
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until recent judicial attempts to dismantle it.2 5s The imagined one
is an expanded bargaining model, based on a nexus-of-contracts
view of the firm.
1. The Railway Labor Act model.
The Railway Labor Act (the "RLA"), 59 which governs labor
relations in the airline and railroad industries, establishes a form
of employee representation and collective bargaining that does not
treat the workplace as an insulated realm. Rather, the RLA calls
upon courts to play an active role in ensuring that management
and labor jointly determine working conditions. The RLA
presumes that all existing conditions and practices are the product
of agreements between management and labor. Moreover, it
presumes that all existing conditions and practices will continue
indefinitely unless and until either management or labor wants to
make a change.26 0 Management and labor must negotiate any such
change before it can be implemented."
The procedure for making a change is specified in Section 6 of
the RLA: A party seeking to make a change must serve on the
other a Notice of Intent to Change Existing Conditions (a "Section
6 Notice").26' The service of the Notice triggers an obligation for
both parties to meet and discuss the proposed change; it also for-
bids either one to alter the status quo while the conferences go
on.262 Thirty days after the end of the conferences, however, both
parties can take unilateral action. The union can strike and the
employer can change a working condition.
Courts enforce the status quo requirement with injunctive
remedies. The status quo period is, in the words of the Supreme
Court, "purposely long and drawn out," so that the pressure of the
passage of time helps resolve the dispute.263 The party who wants
to make a change, faced with the possibility of substantial delay,
258 See Stone, 42 Stan L Rev at 1513-37 (cited in note 218) (describing judicial attempts
to dismantle RLA).
... 45 USC §§ 151 et seq (1982 & Supp 1987).
"I See Stone, 42 Stan L Rev at 1496-98 (cited in note 218) (describing RLA bargaining
and impasse procedures).
261 45 USC § 156.
282 If no agreement is reached, then a mediator is assigned and the conferences con-
tinue. If and when the mediator concludes that further meetings would be futile, he declares
an impasse and offers the parties final and binding arbitration. If either party declines, then
the mediator terminates his efforts and a 30-day count-down period begins. Id.
2. Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co. v United Transportion Union, 396 US 142,
149 (1969).
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has an incentive to compromise or give the other side something it
wants in return.26
Congress inserted this system of settling disputes into the
Railway Labor Act in 1926. It was designed to compel collective
decisionmaking and to reduce the incentives to strike. The power
to compel the other side to maintain the status quo was seen as a
substitute for the power to strike. 6 5
The RLA has proven to be particularily helpful to unions in
their efforts to influence strategic-level corporate decisions, such as
decisions to introduce new technology or to transform the corpo-
rate enterprise. With time and the pressure of the status quo on
their side, unions have often negotiated for outcomes that either
altered the employer's initial decision or cushioned its impact on
union members. In numerous cases-for instance, when carriers
have sought to close part of their operations, to automate and dis-
place existing job categories, or to transfer work to a nonunion af-
filiate-courts have imposed bargaining obligations and a judicially
enforceable status quo.266
Under the RLA, either side can invoke judicial power to en-
force the status quo obligations. In defining the status quo, a court
must determine whether there were past practices, implied con-
tract provisions, or implied waivers of discretion that support ei-
ther side's claim as to what constitutes the status quo. Thus the
structure of the RLA calls for substantial judicial intrusion into
the details of company policy and industrial life.267 In the course of
204 Id at 150.
25 See Stone, 42 Stan L Rev at 1498-99 (cited in note 218) (history of the Section 6
procedures and the status quo requirement).
26 See, for example, Order of Railroad Telegraphers v Chicago & North Western R.
Co., 362 US 330, 341-42 (1960) (holding that railroad's decision to close obsolete and unprof-
itable stations and to lay off some agents and telegraphers was subject to bargaining and
status quo obligation); Southern Ry. Co. v Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 337 F2d
127, 132-33 (DC Cir 1964) (enjoining effort by railroad to eliminate firemen on trains and to
cease hiring new firemen); Ruby v TACA International Airlines, 439 F2d 1359, 1362-64 (5th
Cir 1971) (enjoining airlines' attempt to transfer pilot base from New Orleans to El Salva-
dor); United Industrial Workers v Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 351 F2d 183,
189-92 (5th Cir 1965) (enjoining carrier's effort to lease its facility to another company and
permamently lay off all its employees).
26' For example, in Air Line Pilots v Wien Air Alaska, 120 Labor Rel Ref Man (BNA)
3388 (D Alaska 1984), a district court ruled that a carrier could not close down its operation
and furlough its pilots for administrative reasons because such an action was not within its
agreed-upon past practices. Id at 3391. In contrast, in Conrail, the Supreme Court ruled
that a railroad could unilaterally institute random drug screening of employees because the
union had permitted the company to institute other forms of medical testing in the past.
109 S Ct at 2485-89. See Stone, 42 Stan L Rev at 1518-22 (cited in note 218) (discussing
Conrail).
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this intrusion, courts can and do inject public employment values
and policies into the unionized workplace. Thus, while the RLA
does not eliminate the tension between collective bargaining and
individual employment rights, it does make it possible for those
rights to inform the resolution of disputes.
2. Expanded bargaining within a nexus of contracts.
There is another model of collective bargaining which does not
share the assumptions of industrial pluralism. I call it an expanded
bargaining model. In this model, labor is one stakeholder in the
firm among others, free to contend and bargain with the others for
a role in decisionmaking. This model eliminates the barrier be-
tween collective bargaining and external law.
Traditional theories of the firm assume that shareholders are
the only group with a stake in major corporate decisions. Under
this view, labor contracts with the firm, but is not a part of the
firm.2 68 Further, labor's contracts with the firm are not quite the
same as those of other groups who do business with the firm. La-
bor's contracts take the form of collective bargaining agreements
and are governed by a special body of law, the NLRA, which deter-
mines what subjects can be included in those contracts and the
rules by which they are negotiated.
However, there are new theories of the corporation that give a
much more rich and complex picture of the interests of corporate
actors, and which advocate a broader view of corporate governance.
In a pathbreaking 1976 article in corporate law theory, Jensen and
Meckling proposed that a corporation consists of nothing more
than a bundle of contractual arrangements among a variety of par-
ties-customers, suppliers, lenders, investors, managers, and work-
ers.269 With this insight, the black box view of the corporation col-
lapsed, and the "nexus of contracts" view was born.
Under the nexus of contracts view, no group has an a priori
privileged relation to the entity as a whole. All use their input and
their leverage to strike the best bargain they can. Thus labor
stands on an equal footing with all other contenders for power
268 See Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Vil-
lage?, 95 Harv L Rev 597, 602-03 (1982); Masahiko Aoki, The Co-operative Game Theory of
the Firm 8-9 (Clarendon, 1984).
2. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 305, 311 (1976). See also R. H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, in R. H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law 33
(Chicago, 1988) (reprinted from 4 Economica (Nov 1937)) (arguing that the firm is a substi-
tute for a series of discrete market contractual arrangements).
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within the concern. Under this conception of the firm, for example,
we can imagine collective bargaining transposed to the boardroom,
where unions can then contend with not only management, but all
the other constituent groups that comprise the firm. This ex-
panded bargaining is already occurring in the United States in
Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization proceedings, where unions
sit on creditor committees and negotiate with all the different clas-
ses of creditors about the fate of the enterprise. Similar forms of
expanded bargaining are occurring in troubled industries. 270 Col-
lective bargaining is beginning to overspill its borders and claim
new roles in corporate life.
This model of expanded collective bargaining is fundamentally
different from industrial pluralist views of collective bargaining. It
does not envision labor-management relations as an insulated
mini-democracy. Rather, it permits, even requires, labor to bring to
the bargaining table whatever legal rights, powers and immunities
it has under external sources of law.
For example, creditors have all sorts of liens, collection proce-
dures, and priorities under state and federal laws. These rights
form the background against which creditors make their bargains
with other groups within the firm. So too, under the "nexus of
contracts" model, if employees have rights under external law,
they may use them to exert leverage in their bargaining with the
other groups.
Under this conception of collective bargaining, unions would
take externally imposed employment rights as the starting point
from which to negotiate, the background against which bargaining
would take place. Workers would not have to choose between indi-
vidual employment rights and collective bargaining; the two sys-
tems of rights would be compatible and mutually reinforcing.27 1
This regime would help move American labor law in the direction
of European labor law, where individual rights and collective bar-
2 o See Stone, 55 U Chi L Rev at 76-77 (cited in note 3) (giving examples).
27 Of course, such a model requires careful consideration of the rules governing eco-
nomic weapons. In this model, unions only have clout in negotiations with other constitu-
ents of the firm to the extent that unions can bring a credible threat of withholding their
investment and thereby harming the others. The ability to withhold investments and the
consequence to others-the "negative market power" of unions-is determined by the legal
rules governing strikes, secondary boycotts, picketing, and so forth. Thus this model is in-
complete without specifying the rules of economic warfare.
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gaining are mutually reinforcing aspects of the social welfare
state.272
C. Section 301 Preemption, Industrial Pluralism, and Union
Decline
If we are to imagine any alternative regime of collective labor
rights, we must again consider the issue of union decline. If unions
are declining to the vanishing point, then any legal regime based
on collective employment rights is outdated before it begins. In
Part I, I presented several theories of union decline, and argued in
favor of the view which attributed union decline to a decline in the
actual and perceived effectiveness of unions. One of the most im-
portant factors in explaining union effectiveness is the legal rules
which define the legitimate scope of union activity. In Part II, I
showed that, over the past decade, there have been many changes
in legal rules which have restricted the power of unions to affect
strategic-level corporate decisions. These changes no doubt dimin-
ish union effectiveness in actuality and in the public mind. We can
see now that Section 301 preemption might also play a role in
union decline.
To the extent that unionized workers have fewer rights than
nonunion workers, § 301 preemption has created significant disin-
centives for workers to unionize. While most workers, like most
judges and law professors, are not familiar with the intricacies of
§ 301 preemption doctrine, it is entirely plausible than many
workers have a general sense that state employment law offers as
many or more benefits than do unions. Furthermore, employers
frequently inform their employees during organizing drives that
they will lose various state law rights if they form a union. Under
existing preemption rules, these claims are true. Thus if workers
believe such employer claims, and if the claims influence workers'
272 See Maier, Fictitious bonds at 54-55 (cited in note 234). Labor relations scholarship
in this country has not adequately addressed the problem of harmonizing individual em-
ployee rights with collective employee rights. Instead, most scholars in the field have staked
out a position in favor of one type of right and against the other. However, legal scholars
writing in another contexts have suggested ways to reconceive both types of rights as com-
plementary. See, for example, Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of
Groups, 56 S Cal L Rev 1001 (1983) (suggesting ways that group rights and individual rights
can be conceived as complementary); Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy:
Residential Associations and Community, 75 Cornell L Rev 1 (1989) (suggesting that both
individual and group rights must be understood as limited by a shared commitment to cer-
tain external norms).
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decisions about whether or not to unionize, then the broad § 301
doctrine is a significant factor in union decline.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, the labor relations system in the United States is
undergoing a fundamental change. At the present time, the system
of collective worker empowerment established during the New
Deal stands in opposition to an emerging system based on individ-
ual worker rights, due in large part to an unnecessarily broad § 301
preemption doctrine. As a result, unions have declined in numbers
and in political power, endangering collective as well as individual
employment rights. I have attempted to show the fault lines in the
New Deal system of collective regulation that enabled this new
structure to emerge. I have also offered two alternative nonplural-
ist legal regimes of collective bargaining in order to demonstrate
that it is possible to harmonize individual and collective rights. Ei-
ther would be a form of regulation that could promote a revitalized
labor movement into the next century. Without some program, we
risk a future with a workforce that is disorganized, disempowered,
and disenfranchised.
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